

I. Introduction: The Problem of Civil Strife

It is easy to conclude that civil strife was always a part of ancient Rome. Indeed, civil war plagued the Republic until its ultimate downfall, for which reason scholars have posited that Romans were unwaveringly aware of their history of civil war, that it plagued their consciousness. They point to the mythical confrontation between the brothers Romulus and Remus as proof that violence between citizens was a crucial aspect of Roman identity.¹ However, upon further examination, I believe that, while civil war was a present reality, the idea of civil war conceptually avoided throughout the Roman Republic, and that Republican Romans developed selective cultural amnesia with regard to civil war. At times, they take pains not to mention it and point to its *novitas*. In *Remus: A Roman Myth*, T.P. Wiseman explores the foundational myth of Rome, in which the twins Romulus and Remus found Rome, and Romulus kills Remus.² Wiseman discovers that the myth has evolved over time, since “changed circumstances demand new myths to comprehend them.”³ Indeed, a fixed version of the myth has never existed, and possibilities encompass both twins founding Rome, Remus being killed by various agents or by Romulus himself, or even Remus outliving Romulus. The relationship between the Republic and civil war is as complicated and diverse as are the versions of the Romulus and Remus story. In examining how the Romans conceptualized civil war, especially during the Late Republic, I will look at Caesar’s depiction of the beginning of the Civil War, Sallust’s account of the conspiracy of Catiline, and Livy’s Coriolanus episode.

¹ For example, see the introduction to *Citizens of Discord: Rome and Its Civil Wars*, eds. Brian W. Breed, Cynthia Damon, Andreola Rossi (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 3-22; F.R. Cowell, *The Great Revolutions: The Revolutions of Ancient Rome* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., 1963).

² T.P. Wiseman includes a flow chart in *Remus: A Roman Myth* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 14 that shows all the possible versions of the myth.

³ Wiseman, *Remus*, 140.

The History of the History

Citizens of Discord: Rome and its Civil Wars, edited by Brian Breed, Damon, and Andreola Rossi, provides a landmark discussion of how Romans conceptualized civil war. In their introduction to this volume, the editors assert that civil war was essential to the Roman identity. Discussing the Temple of Concord (and why there is no Temple of Discord), they comment that “as perversely appropriate as a Temple of Discord would have been, the Romans did not need one to remind them of the persistence of civil war in their society.”⁴ They argue for a keen awareness in the Roman consciousness of the role of Discord in civil strife. While this is a valid argument for Augustan and post-Augustan Rome, the editors limit their discussion, whether intentionally or not, to writers from the Principate—Horace, Virgil, Livy, and Lucan. This introduction ignores the active effort on the part of Romans, like Sallust and Caesar, to diminish the importance of civil war in their national psyche. Breed, Damon, and Rossi present the various theories about civil war put forth in the chapters of their book—that it is a curse; an expiation for the murder of Remus; or some sort of congenital defect that afflicts the Republic⁵—but they never mention that civil war was a concept actively ignored or suppressed while civil war was actually occurring. I hope to rectify this omission.

In *Roman Honor: The Fire in the Bones*, Carlin Barton argues for scholars to pay more attention to the Roman emotional life. She examines emotions associated with the accumulation of *honores* (which “might include offices, crowns, statues, and panegyrics”⁶) and believes that these emotions motivated the actions of many famous Romans. Arguing that a desire for

⁴ *Citizens of Discord*, eds. Brian Breed, Cynthia Damon, Andreola Rossi (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 4. It must be noted that the introduction as a whole contains a number of other solid observations and is immeasurably helpful and informative.

⁵ See especially *Citizens of Discord*, Chapters 1, 2, 6, and 7.

⁶ Carlin A. Barton, *Roman Honor: The Fire in the Bones* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001), 11.

honores consumed Roman society from the upper echelon down to the slave class, Barton equates the accumulation of *honores* with *dignitas* and status, both of which were fundamental to Roman evaluations of worth. She attributes the importance of *honores* to the Roman affinity for contest, and singles out the bonds of family and the challenge laid down between generations as the origin and epitome of a Roman contest culture. As Barton explains, the contest ensured that “the Roman was radically present in a role or game in which life or reputation was at risk.”⁷ I argue that the narratives of Caesar, Sallust, and Livy place the conflicts they depict within this Roman contest culture. “Undergoing the ordeal (*labor, periculum, discrimen, certamen, contentio, agon*)”—participating in a contest—determined one’s worth in society, which “was necessary for one’s sense of being.”⁸ Barton groups Coriolanus, Catiline, and Caesar together as men “who took the competition seriously.”⁹ These were men who “might have the temerity to overturn all the laws of man and god to secure preeminence for himself,”¹⁰ and they were men who posed the greatest threat to the Republic.¹¹ Their ambition and desire for honor allows such competitive individuals to confuse public and private conflict, to turn personal vendettas into civil war.

In this project, I examine the inherent tension between the Roman exemplary ideal, according to which citizens compete only in terms of virtue and service to the Republic, and the ambitious, aristocratic individual who subverts that ideal by taking it to the extreme and competing for control of the Republic. Each of the three accounts I discuss features a Roman aristocrat reacting to a public conflict and perversely making that public, political issue into a

⁷ Barton, *Roman Honor*, 86.

⁸ *Ibid.*, 35.

⁹ *Ibid.*, 100.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 100.

¹¹ Barton explains that “the threat that the powerful man would turn against his own people or open the vendetta in defense of his own honor hung over Rome as it did over all warrior cultures. In the Roman contest culture, the margin had ever been thin between a flame and a conflagration; the contest easily crossed over into civil strife” (99).

private conflict. Each man deals with his private, personal anger by marching on the city of Rome. They embody the threat described by Carlin Barton of the contest culture spilling over into civil strife.

Written first out of the three works, Caesar's *Bellum Civile* lays the foundations for the other two narratives, particularly by means of its vocabulary. The importance of *iniuria* and *dignitas*, for example, in Caesar's rationale for marching on Rome reappear throughout Sallust and Livy. Moreover, Caesar's treatment of the concept of *novitas* in civil war will shape the ways in which the other authors relate to this terminology. Cynthia Damon and William Batstone's *Caesar's Civil War*, especially thorough in its examination of Book I, provides an essential foundation to the political circumstances in which Caesar acted and wrote, and addresses the role Caesar's *commentarius* played in his greater argument. They elucidate the political importance of this document, as one which rationalizes Caesar's actions in the civil war. In addition, in the book's epilogue, they explain how, at the time of his writing *Bellum Civile*, Caesar has begun rebuilding the Roman state on the basis of his own personal connections, "with no more than a nod to the prewar political system."¹² As regards that prewar system, Harriett Flower's *Roman Republics* provides a convincing and paradigm-shifting alternative to the traditional chronology of the Republic and offers a new approach. She groups events in a way that does away with the traditional division of the Republic into "Early," "Middle," and "Late." Instead, Flower proposes a new timeline of six different Republican governments, preceded first by a pre-Republican, post-monarchical traditional period and then by a proto-republic. Flower accommodates other transitional periods, and she views the two triumvirates, the civil war between Caesar and Pompey, and the dictatorship of Caesar not as truly republican, but as

¹² William W. Batstone and Cynthia Damon, "Epilogue: Surviving Failure," *Caesar's Civil War* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 166-171.

distinctly something else. This re-thinking of chronology is especially helpful in considering the events of the Late Republic, and Flower's new framework surfaces in my argument about Caesar.

In his *Bellum Catilinae*, Sallust approaches the year 63 BC through the lens of Rome immediately after the assassination of Julius Caesar. To some extent, however, Sallust also approaches this immediately post-Caesarian Rome through the lens of the events of 63 BC. William Batstone, in addition to his work on Caesar with Cynthia Damon, has done much of the most recent work on Sallust. His ambitious chapter in *Citizens of Discord*, "Word At War: The Prequel" interprets Sallust's work in light of John Henderson's provocative article "Lucan / The Word At War." In this article, Batstone argues that the word is always at war, not just during conditions of civil war, and he makes insightful observations about the nature of *gloria*, *libertas*, and *dignitas* in Sallust's work. In another article, "The Antithesis of Virtue: Sallust's 'Synkrisis' and the Crisis of the Late Republic," Batstone compares the treatment of Cato and Caesar in the *Bellum Catilinae*, with insightful commentary on the use of *dignitas*, a marked Caesarian term. I also depend on K. Waters' "Cicero, Sallust, and Catiline." While I question Waters argument that Sallust buys into Cicero's self-aggrandizement of himself as consul during the conspiracy, the article does provide a good outline of the political situation and basic analysis of the nature of the conspiracy. In "The Interpretation of Sallust Catiline 10.1-11.3," Duane Conley offers an analysis of Sallust's contradictory and inconsistent treatment of *ambitio* and *avaritia* in his preface. He proposes an alternative to this problem, conceptualized as the "avaritia-ambitio syndrome," in which the combination of the two societal ills is more important than either of them is alone. The works of Ronald Syme and of D.C. Earl remain fundamental to any discussion of Sallust.

Most work on civil strife at Rome ignores or treats very cursorily the story of Coriolanus.¹³ I believe that the Coriolanus story is important to our understanding of the Roman conceptualization of civil strife. Alan Lehman's "The Coriolanus Story in Antiquity" provides a basic, yet broad discussion of the Coriolanus narrative throughout Roman historiography. Similarly, Tim Cornell treats Coriolanus as an archetype "Coriolanus: Myth, History, and Performance," in *Myth, History, and Culture: Studies in Honour of T.P. Wiseman* (2003), and he discusses the possible ways in which the story was transmitted. While many studies on the history of Roman civil conflict or of Livy give Coriolanus only passing mention, a number of scholars devote much worthwhile attention to Livy. Notable among them are Jane Chaplin and Christina Kraus (both individually, in Chaplin's *Livy's Exemplary History*, and together in *Oxford Readings in Classical Studies: Livy*). The classic commentary of Ogilvie (1965) is indispensable for the first pentad of Livy, and I draw heavily on his argument that Livy is retrojecting Late Republican issues into much of his history of early Rome, including the Coriolanus narrative. Gary B. Miles, in *Livy: Reconstructing Early Rome* (1995), also examines the interplay between Livy's narrative of early Rome and the political conditions in which he wrote. Building upon these scholars' work, I plan to examine how the story of Coriolanus, in particular, interacts with other, later instances of personal ambition and civil conflict at Rome.

Motives for Marching

¹³ For example, F.R. Cowell, *The Great Revolutions: The Revolutions of Ancient Rome* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1962) provides a survey of all the great revolutions and civil conflicts of Rome, within the context of a larger political history. While an important foundational work, the book lacks an argument and instead offers largely unsubstantiated generalizations and moralistic judgments; pp. 44-45 address Coriolanus.

In *De Republica* II.23-24, Cicero describes how, in the period of the monarchy, when a king had died, the *patres* would rotate power among the members of the senate, never letting one senator have the *imperium* for too long, until a new king emerged. This self-policing was meant to enforce the importance of collective good and to prevent one man from having too much power. This constitutes the essential governing philosophy of the Roman Republic. Writing during a time of upheaval at Rome, Cicero described this system retroactively as a model for Roman politicians of his own day, encouraging them to share power and not to let one from among them gain too much influence. Towards the end of the Republic, as powerful generals let their personal ambitions get out of control, this system faltered. Even the traditional exemplar of Republicanism, Cicero himself, fell victim to such ambition. Writing to Cato from his appointment in Tarsus in 51 or 50 BC, Cicero recounts his military successes there and asks for Cato's support in seeking a triumph. He explains that, although "glory in and for itself never seemed to me worth the pursuing...after the wrong I suffered...I have been ambitious to receive tokens of esteem, the more flattering the better, from the Senate and the People of Rome."¹⁴ Cicero describes the triumph he requests as "not without an element of an injured man's craving for balm to heal his wound."¹⁵ Here, Cicero admits to the same ambition and desire for *gloria* that we find in all three historical accounts.

Writing in the mid 1st century BC about the Catilinarian conspiracy, Sallust laments the "unprecedented" nature of recent events and longs for the virtue of days gone by. However, like many other writers, Sallust outwardly avoided the notion that personal ambition and civil conflict

¹⁴ Cicero, *Letters to His Friends*, trans. Shackelton Bailey. Loeb Classical Library. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2001), Letter 110 (XV.4.13): *ipsam quidem gloriam per se numquam putavi expetendam...idem post iniuriam acceptam...studui quam ornatisima senatus populi que Romani de me iudicia intercedere.*

¹⁵ Cicero, *Letters to His Friends*, Letter 110 (XV.4.14): *in qua inest aliqua vis disideri ad sanandum vulnus iniuriae.*

were not new to Rome. Linguistically referring to revolution as *res novae*,¹⁶ Romans did not view revolution, or in Catiline's case attempted revolution, as an integral part of their collective memory. I posit that the conceptualization of civil war as a foundational truth of Rome, argued for in the introduction to *Citizens of Discord*, is a result of Augustan influence. Augustan propaganda insisted that he had not just quelled a generation of conflict, but indeed had put an end hundreds of years of civil war and removed its violent potential from Roman political life. While civil conflict had occurred at Rome for centuries, Republican writers shied away from confronting this reality. Only under the Principate, once they were removed from situations of actual conflict, could Roman writers confront their history of civil war. Livy, in particular, creates a Roman history based in civil war.

I argue that, despite the inability of Republican Romans to see or admit it, the personal ambition of elite men is intrinsically embedded in the Roman contest culture, and that since the foundation of the Republic, that ambition has led to civil strife. Writing sometime in the years following the assassination of Julius Caesar,¹⁷ Sallust argues that ambition, "a vice which was, however, nearer to a virtue," had afflicted Romans in a negative way for some time, indeed *primo*, "at first".¹⁸ He describes how "both the good and the ignoble equally long for glory, honor, and power; but one struggles on the true path, and the other, since they lack good skills, contend by means of treachery and deception."¹⁹ Sallust understood ambition as a characteristic

¹⁶ *Oxford Latin Dictionary*, s.v. "novus."

¹⁷ The introduction to Sallust, *The War With Catiline*, trans. J.C. Rolfe, Loeb Classical Library (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1971), xiii: "The exact time when the *Catiline* was written is uncertain, but the language of the eulogy of Caesar indicates that it was not published until after the death of the dictator. Some scholars maintain that it was issued immediately after the assassination, while others assign it to the year 40 BC."

OLD, s.v. "primo"; "1. At first, originally, to begin with; first of all; 2. For the first time, on the first occasion; firstly; 3. Before."

¹⁸ *Sed primo magis ambitio quam avaritia animos hominum exercebat, quod tamen vitium propius virtutem erat* (*Cat.* XI.1). Translations are my own unless otherwise noted.

¹⁹ *Nam gloriam, honorem, imperium bonus et ignavus aequae sibi exoptant; sed ille vera via nititur, huic quia bonae artes desunt, dolis atque fallaciis contendit* (*Cat.* XI.2).

intrinsic to Roman public life—indeed, it had existed *primo*—but he also recognized that ambitious Romans could use this trait as a vice. He emphasizes that *gloria* must be won by “noble skills,”²⁰ a factor which seems to be differentiated, to some extent, by motivation. Thus, Sallust seems to acknowledge, for the most part in between the lines, that the potential for civil strife has existed at Rome *primo*.

The difference between the conceptualization of civil war in Caesar’s *Bellum Civile* and in Livy is hard to ignore. Caesar’s efforts to make his actions seem acceptable within the Republican power structure contrast with Livy’s depiction of Coriolanus blatantly plotting against Rome. Caesar refers to his enemies as *inimici*, while Coriolanus treats his as *hostes*.²¹ Yet, Livy still draws on Caesar’s emphasis on *iniuria* and *dignitas*. Writing during times of actual conflict, both Caesar and Sallust are grappling with how to present civil war in their works while their audiences are still experiencing it. On the other hand, Livy writes after Octavian has solidified his control of Rome, so he can view civil war as a part of Rome’s past, not its present.

I discuss first Caesar’s *Bellum Civile*, focusing primarily on the first book, which shows how Caesar and Pompey struggle with each other to determine what about their conflict is private, what is public, and what is *novus*. Next, I examine Sallust’s *Bellum Catilinae* and how both author and protagonist manipulate ideas about *novitas* and ambition, and how Sallust creates a Caesar of sorts in his Catiline. Through Catiline, Sallust shows how the combination of a new degree of both luxury and impoverishment has revealed the problems inherent in a contest culture that promotes ambition. Finally, I look at Livy’s account of Coriolanus and how Livy projects back in time the same issues that surfaced during the last half of the first century BC. Personal insult and aristocratic competition—both of which feature prominently in both Caesar’s

²⁰ For more on *bonae artes* and how they restrict the acquisition of *gloria*, see D.C. Earl, *The Political Thought of Sallust* (Chicago: Argonaut, Inc., 1966), 11-13.

²¹ For the distinction between *hostis* and *inimicus*, see pp. 14, 47-48.

and Sallust's works—appear in Livy as inherent problems of the Roman history of civil war. I ultimately posit that, by means of their civil strife narratives, both Sallust and Livy are attempting to make sense of Caesar's march on Rome and, in Livy's case, understand its aftermath.

II. Caesar's *Bellum Civile*: Personal Insult Becomes Public Conflict

In March 49 BC, Julius Caesar's governorship of Gallia Cisalpina, Gallia Narbonensis, and Illyricum had run its course, during which time his former son-in-law and political ally/rival Pompey had served as consul for the third time, in 52 BC, this time by himself. At the end of 50 BC, both men were serving as governors (Caesar in Gaul; Pompey in Spain), and each controlled a powerful army. Instead of returning to Rome as a private citizen, at which point he could have been tried for exceeding his limits as governor, Caesar wanted to stand for election for the consulship of 49 *in absentia*, but Pompey, as the self-appointed defender of the constitutional republic and the conservative order of the senate, threatened Rome with his own force, if the senate were to comply with Caesar.¹ When the senate refused Caesar's offer that he would disband his troops if Pompey did the same, the tribunes, Antony and Q. Cassius, partisans of Caesar, used their veto. In the chaos that ensued, the senate passed the *senatus consultus ultimum*, effectively declaring martial law at Rome. When the tribunes fled to Caesar's camp at Ravenna, in Northern Italy, Caesar crossed the Rubicon, the traditional boundary between Gaul and Rome, and began marching on the city.² Civil war had commenced. Carlin Barton explains that, "In the Roman contest culture, the greatest threat to Roman society was never the external enemy but rather the rogue male, the *rex*, the tyrant who was the one consistently demonized character in Roman culture."³ Julius Caesar turned out to embody this threat.

¹ Ronald Syme, "Caesar the Dictator," *The Roman Revolution* (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1939), 47-60 provides an excellent outline of the political situation at hand. See also Erich S. Gruen, *The Last Generation of the Roman Republic* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1974).

² The introduction to Julius Caesar, *The Civil War*, trans. A.G. Peskett, Loeb Classical Library (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 1914) gives adequate detail (especially, vii-ix).

³ Barton, *Roman Honor*, 100-101.

The years 52-49 had been a time of uncertainty, with Caesar taking unprecedented steps in Gaul to control the province and also increase his personal authority and wealth. While the beginning of the civil war did not necessarily resolve the problems of the preceding years, all involved parties must have hoped that it would at least settle the immediate tensions between Caesar and Pompey. The preceding governments⁴ had failed to resolve a number of underlying issues, like overwhelmingly unevenly distributed wealth, the inability of Romans to feed themselves, and crippling debt, most famously brought up by the Gracchi brothers.⁵ Caesar seemed to recognize that the current condition of Republican politics dictated that a solution come from outside the current scheme. A drastic change was necessary in order for anyone to begin to solve the many problems facing Rome.

Caesar's *Bellum Civile* represents not only a historical account of the events of the years 49-48 BC, but also his attempt to convince the Roman people of his political agenda and motives. Writing at some point between 48-44 BC,⁶ Caesar did not finish the work. During this time period, Caesar took up the position of dictator. In 46 BC, he was made dictator for the next ten years; in 44 BC, for life. Yet, as Syme rightly points out, Caesar was not in the position to make major political overhauls. Syme describes him as “a Sulla but for *clementia*, a Gracchus but lacking a revolutionary programme...a champion of the People, he had to curb the People's

⁴ Harriet Flower explains about Sulla's coup: The use of force constituted an admission, or perhaps often an assertion of the failure of the accepted political system to resolve conflict or even to manage some of the regular functions of government” *Roman Republics* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2010), 82. For the problems of grain and gang violence, see Flower, *Roman Republics*, 149-50. Cowell, *The Great Revolutions*, provides a solid outline of the various periods of major unrest in Republican history.

⁵ The Gracchi brothers are lamented by Cicero (*De Legibus* III.IX.20). Cowell discusses the Gracchi with summaries of the issues they tried to address and their plans (*The Great Revolutions*, 77-105); he mentions debt and land redistribution as causes of unrest (30-32, 40-1, 54). Cowell also the Conflict of the Orders as a source of civil strife in early Republican history and the resolution of civil conflict under Augustus (188-191). R.M. Ogilvie, *A Commentary on Livy, Books 1-5* (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1965), especially in his commentary on the Coriolanus episode in Livy, shows how Livy often projected such issues of food supply and debt that were prominent in the Late Republic into conflicts of the Early Republic, a perspective of which Cowell does not seem to be aware.

⁶ Batstone and Damon, *Caesar's Civil War*, 31; this is really the only option for dating, as the work must have been written during the time between events it depicts and Caesar's death.

rights.”⁷ At once, a military *commentarius*,⁸ an autobiographical history, and a political rationalization, this work is Caesar’s self-justification. His audience, for the most part, would have experienced first-hand the events depicted, or would have participated in them. Thus, Caesar had to write an account that could both accommodate his audience’s pre-existing knowledge of the situation and present his own point of view in a way that was convincing and palatable.

In this chapter, I explore the ways in which Caesar paints this civil war as a conflict both between him and Pompey and between *res publica* and *res privata*. To do so, I examine Caesar’s diction, focusing on *inimici*, *iniuria*, *dignitas*, and *novus*. The first section of this chapter deals with how Caesar portrays Pompey’s motivations as entirely private and self-serving. In the second section, I address how Caesar counters his portrayal of Pompey by justifying his own private motivations that could, if he were not careful, contradict his entire argument. At the same time, Caesar notably does not place his actions within the historical context of the civil wars and marches on Rome that had become increasingly common during the 1st century BC—like those of Marius, Sulla, Cinna, and Catiline’s conspiracy of 63 BC. Instead, while distancing himself from the term *novus*, Caesar makes his actions appear as the natural and legal solution to the political situation, which is, in turn, portrayed as a result of wrongs done by Pompey and his partisans. However, despite his insistence to the contrary, Caesar is playing the part of Carlin Barton’s “rogue male” and acting out his own ambition, forming the inherent paradox of the Republic.

⁷ Syme, *The Roman Revolution* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1939), 51.

⁸ Batstone and Damon translate *commentarius* as “records,” *Caesar’s Civil War*, 8-9. They also explain its root in words pertaining to memory and mind and give its historical background as “a public figure’s record of his achievements, his *res gestae*.”

Pompey's Private Enmity

To defend his actions as undertaken for the sake of the *res publica*, Caesar characterizes his opponents, specifically Pompey, as acting out a private vendetta on a public scale. Early in the work, he refers to his opponents as *inimici*, a term which can have private and civilian, in addition to public, connotations.⁹ According to Caesar's description, Pompey is attempting to co-opt the authority of the senate, and bullying the senators into going along with his plan. Pompey calls his own meeting of the senate outside of the city and presumes to have the authority to praise the more cooperative senators and to punish those who are less cooperative.¹⁰ Caesar plainly accuses Pompey of acting "stirred up by the enemies of Caesar and because he wanted that no one be his equal in terms of dignity."¹¹ Portraying Pompey as motivated by personal enmity and his desire to be unequalled, Caesar engenders in the audience a negative reaction to Pompey's inappropriate and private motivations.

On the other hand, Caesar is careful to give his own actions a public and political context. The violation of the rights and authority of the tribunes, committed by the consuls who were partisans of Pompey, appear at the beginning of Caesar's account and provide the immediate instigation for Caesar's march on Rome.¹² Caesar highlights the abuse of power by the consuls as symptomatic of the decay of the Republic. On the surface, this is a legitimate cause of

⁹ OLD, s.v. "inimicus": While it can refer to "one of a hostile army," it tends towards "Unfriendly, ill-disposed (to a person; to a cause, principle, or sim), "a personal (esp.) political enemy, opponent); as opposed to "hostis," for which the first definition is "a foreigner, stranger," followed by "one engaged in hostile (military) activities against a country."

¹⁰ *Misso ad vesperum senatu omnes, qui sunt eius ordinis, a Pompeio evocantur, laudat promptos atque in posterum confirmat, segniores castigat atque incitat.* "When the senate was dismissed in the evening, all who are on his side are called out by Pompey, he praises those who are ready and strengthens them in their resolve, the sluggish ones he admonishes and stirs up" (I.3).

¹¹ *ab inimicis Caesaris incitatus et quod neminem dignitate secum exaequari volebat* (I.4).

¹² Indeed, the efforts of the tribunes appear in the first sentence of the entire work. *Litteris Caesaris consulibus redditus aegre ab his impetratum est summa tribunorum plebes contentione, ut in senatu recitarentur.* "When the Caesar's letters had been delivered to the consuls, it was obtained, with difficulty and with the most strenuous effort on the part of the tribunes of the plebs, that they be read aloud in the senate" (I.1).

complaint, and Caesar successfully portrays himself as acting for the good of the Republic. He depicts himself and the tribunes as battling the supremacy and authority of Pompey and his allies in order to have Caesar's dispatch read in the senate. According to this account, by blurring the lines between his personal conflict with Caesar (characterized as a spat between *inimici*) and the future of the Republic, Pompey has inappropriately brought their disagreement into the public arena. Caesar emphasizes Pompey and his cronies, not Caesar, brought about the conflict and caused problems. Thus, at the immediate beginning of the narrative, Caesar portrays his political opponents, like the consul Lentulus, as obeying their own interests and ignoring those of the senate and the Republic, which conveniently align with Caesar's agenda.¹³ He also includes instances of Pompey threatening the senate into abandoning Caesar's cause, an effort which might have alarmed that part of Caesar's audience which may not have been aware (or as aware as Caesar would like) of Pompey's abuse of power.¹⁴ At first, the conflict appears to be instigated by Pompey, no more than a personal issue between the two of them. However, Caesar broadens the conflict into one in which Pompey and his cronies are attacking the interests of the Republic, which Caesar must defend.

Only by showing himself to be on the side of the Republic does Caesar legitimize his actions and cast himself as a defender of Rome.¹⁵ By portraying his actions as a defense of

¹³ *sin Caesarem respiciant atque eius gratiam sequantur, ut superioribus fecerint temporibus, se sibi consilium capturum neque senatus auctoritati obtemperaturum* "that, if they (the senators) regard Caesar and strive for his praise, as was done in times past, he (Lentulus) would follow his own plan and not obey the authority of the senate" (I.1).

¹⁴ *quorum vocibus et concursu terrentur infirmiores, dubii confirmantur, plerisque vero libere discernendi potestas eripitur* "By whose voices and tumult the weaker are terrified, the hesitant are strengthened and the power of deciding in true freedom is snatched from the many" (I.3).

¹⁵ Barton emphasizes the importance of being on the defensive side of a contest. She sees as "the strength of the Roman agonistic ideal that it allowed the Romans both to be ferociously aggressive and simultaneously to see themselves as strenuously defending themselves and their allies or righteously retaliating for wrongs done." Moreover, as Catiline will also argue, "the Romans needed to see themselves as fighting for *patria, domus, di penates*," *Roman Honor*, 51.

public interests against Pompey's personal encroachments, Caesar places his personal problem within a greater public context, thereby lending greater authority to his march on Rome.

According to Harriet Flower, Caesar's crossing the Rubicon, which marked the beginning of the civil war between him and Pompey, constitutes the end of the transitional period between the triumvirate and the dictatorship of Caesar. Having put the end of the last Republic in the year 60 BC, Flower argues that Caesar ended not what is commonly referred to as the Late Republic, but instead a transitional period following the demise of the First Triumvirate.¹⁶ Nevertheless, Caesar takes pains to make it appear that he is acting within the accepted structure of Republican governance. To some degree, he wants the situation both ways—he wants to be perceived as rescuing the Republic, which was beyond rescuing, but without appearing to act illegally or outside of traditional Republican politics.

In an effort to distance himself from any negative association with the term, Caesar is careful in his use of *novitas* or *res novae*. Caesar generally casts *novitas*, when used outside the military arena, as a negative idea and often uses the term in invective contexts. The account rarely uses words relating to *novitas* to describe Caesar's actions, although this time period, perhaps more than other times in Roman history, justifies the distinction. A good number of the appearances of the adjective *novus* in Book I relate to military happenings and maneuvers.¹⁷ Batstone and Damon only reference three instances of “strange new” (*novus*) in Book I in their word distribution table, and each of these instances regards Caesar's enemies.¹⁸ Only once does

¹⁶ Flower presents a complete breakdown and explanation of her proposed chronology in *Roman Republics* (33), and she discusses Caesar's return from Gaul and the notion that the political circumstances at Rome were completely changed and not a Republic (152-3).

¹⁷ See, for example, 1.24, 1.63, 1.64, 1.65, 1.70, 1.78, 1.9, 1.80; often refers to freshness of troops or physical placement in a formation.

¹⁸ The table “Structure and Word Distribution in Book I” in Batstone and Damon, *Caesar's Civil War*, 86-7 is essential. Caesar addresses his troops: *novum in re publica introductum exemplum queritur, ut tribunicia intercessio armis notaretur atque opprimeretur, quae superioribus annis armis esset restituta*. “He laments that a new model is being introduced in the Republic, so that the intervention of the tribunes was branded and oppressed, which had

Caesar use the term *novus* to refer to his actions outside of troop movements, and even in this case, he puts the word in Pompey's mouth. At I.34, Pompey warns the people of Massilia against being swayed by Caesar's favors, instructing them "not to let the new kindness of Caesar drive out the memory of his [Pompey's] old favors."¹⁹ Caesar is careful to show Pompey as the one employing petty invective against Caesar. The use of "new" is meant ironically, since Caesar is arguing that his benefactions are not, in fact, new developments. The reader is meant to react negatively towards Pompey's accusation, although it may have been, to some degree, correct. However, by showing Pompey as the one insulting and slandering his opponent, Caesar reinforces Pompey's improper conduct.

In other cases of *novitas* throughout the account, Caesar presents himself dealing with and overcoming unprecedented (*novae*) circumstances.²⁰ At I.85, Caesar explains in the third person that "all these things had already been prepared against him; against him authorities of a new kind have been created, so that the same man may, at the gates, preside over the governance of the city and, absent, for so many years hold on to the two fiercest provinces," continuing for some length in this same fashion.²¹ By criticizing the unprecedented circumstances with which he is confronted and making it appear as though he had no choice but to march on Rome from Gaul, Caesar shuns any connection between his revolution and *novitas*. Nevertheless, Caesar's

been restored by arms in years past" (I.7). Concerning Petreius in Spain: *Sic terror oblatus a ducibus, crudelitas in supplicio, nova religio iurisiurandi spem praesentis deditiois sustulit mentesque militum convertit et rem ad pristinam belli rationem redegit*. "Thus terror was brought on by the leaders, cruelty in punishment, and a new obligation of oath-swearing removed the hope of present surrender, and altered the minds of the soldiers, and returned the situation to the original method of war" (I.76).

¹⁹ *ne nova Caesaris officia veterum suorum beneficiorum in eos memoriam expellerent* (I.34).

²⁰ For example, the *nova religio iurisiurandi* of Afranius and Petreius (I.76).

²¹ In *oratio obliqua, omnia haec iam pridem contra se parari; in se novi generis imperia constitui, ut idem ad portas urbanis praesideat rebus et duas bellicosissimas provincias absens tot annis obtineat*. He continues: *in se iura magistratuum commutari, ne ex praetura et consulatu, ut semper, sed per paucos probati et electi in provincias mittantur*. "Against him, the rights of the magistrates were altered that they not, after the praetorship and the consulate be sent into the provinces, approved and selected by the few." (I.85)

actions, more so than other recent attempts to overhaul Roman society and governance, in fact result in a new state of affairs at Rome.

Caesar Makes the Private Public

Caesar complicates the political agenda of *Bellum Civile* when he discusses his own reasons and motivations for action. Despite having criticized Pompey for acting out of private interests, Caesar also paints his own motivations in terms of a private conflict. In his first speech to his troops, conveyed through *oratio obliqua*, Caesar “reminds them of the injuries against him over time by all his enemies: he laments that Pompey was led away by them and was perverted by the envy and disparagement of his own esteem, whose honor and dignity he himself had always supported and aided.”²² Later, “he urged that they defend the judgment and dignity of him under whose command for eight years they had made the Republic most happy and had joined many favorable battles and had pacified all of Gaul and Germania.”²³ While he accuses Pompey and other *inimici* of using private arguments and of manipulating the *res publica* in the context of a private conflict, Caesar himself calls his soldiers to arms over his own private insult. He must be careful not to incur the envy or resentment of his audience whom he has stirred up by accusing Pompey of private motives, yet according to Caesar, both he and Pompey are concerned with the perception of their own *dignitas*.²⁴

²² *omnium temporum iniurias inimicorum in se commemorat: a quibus deductum ac depravatum Pompeium queritur invidia atque obtrectatione laudis suae, cuius ipse honori et dignitati semper faverit adiutorque fuerit* (I.7).

²³ *hortatur, cuius imperatoris ductu VIII annis rem publicam felicissime gesserint plurimaque proelia secunda fecerint, omnem Galiam Germaniamque pacaverint, ut eius existimationem dignitatemque ab inimicis defendant* (I.7).

²⁴ The pertinent definitions from *OLD*, s.v. “*dignitas*”: “fitness (for a task, etc., stated or implied), suitability, worthiness; the quality of being worthy, excellence; rank, status; standing, esteem, importance.”

Iniuria, which Caesar claims to be avenging, covers a broad range of connotations.²⁵ For instance, it can merely refer to a personal wrong. Discussing the paramount importance of honor in Roman society, Carlin Barton introduces a number of arguments about how perceptions honor affected Republican politics. She cites Donald Earl's *The Moral and Political Tradition of Rome*: "The Romans, on the whole, lacked either interest in or capacity for abstract political theorizing. To the Republican politician politics was a personal and social matter."²⁶ Even if Caesar views the *iniuria* done to him only in personal terms, that insult could still carry over into the political sphere. This represents the first possible complication in distinguishing private and public conflicts

Yet, moving beyond the personal and the private, Caesar expands his definition of *iniuria* to claim that that he is righting a wrong done to the state. At the very core of *iniuria* lies a violation of *ius*, which can range from "a particular provision of the legal code, a law, rule, or ordinance" to "that which is good and just, the principles of law, equity, the right."²⁷ Barton emphasizes the importance to Romans of being on the defensive side of a fight,²⁸ and Caesar definitely construes himself, his *dignitas*, and the Republic—all encompassed in *ius*—as under attack. To underline his association with the interests of the Republic and his audience, Caesar often uses the first person plural to refer to his army.²⁹ As the first person plural emphasizes, Caesar intentionally blurs the distinction between the wrongs done to himself and those done to

²⁵ OLD, s.v. "iniuria," 1. Unlawful conduct (opp. *Ius*); damage unlawfully inflicted; 2. Unjust and injurious treatment or an instance of it, a wrong, injustice; 3. (abl. sig. as adv.) Without regard for equity, unjustly; without just cause, unjustifiably; 4. Any act, insulting in kind and intention, calculated to injure a person's reputation or outrage his feelings (ranging from physical assault to defamation of character; an insult, an affront); 5. Loss or detriment inflicted on or sustained by a person in respect of his estate, rights; 6. Physical injury or impairment."

²⁶ Barton, *Roman Honor*, 3 (n.8); Earl (1967).

²⁷ OLD, "ius," definitions 3 and 7.

²⁸ Barton, *Roman Honor*, 52.

²⁹ Batstone and Damon explain that, while "our" was often used to reference a Roman army, this distinction took on added significance during a civil war. Caesar wants to be considered "our general" *Caesar's Civil War*, 147-8.

the Republic. Yet, by writing from a third person point of view, Caesar creates distance between himself and his narrative and adds an aura of objectivity and legitimacy.

Thus, to limit Caesar's actions to just the private realm disregards the implications that these actions had for the *res publica*. As Caesar describes the crisis with which he is confronted, the good of Caesar and the good of the *res publica* are inseparable. As Batstone and Damon point out, by portraying himself as the representative of the *res publica*, Caesar juxtaposes his defense of the interests of the people and of true government with the private concerns of his opponents.³⁰ However, this interpretation does not take into account Caesar's own citation of the *iniuria* done to his own *honor* and *dignitas*. There is clearly some balance and co-dependence between the personal and the public in Caesar's defense of his motivations.

The qualities that Caesar describes as under attack from his enemies at I.7, *existimatio* and *dignitas*, carried special weight in Roman thought; they were actively cultivated, especially by members of the political elite. Barton points out how Cicero describes the level of emphasis laid on personal honor as a motivating factor in Republican politics. He writes that "by nature we yearn and hunger for honor, and once we have glimpsed, as it were, some part of its radiance, there is nothing we are not prepared to bear and suffer in order to secure it."³¹ This yearning for honor was a major motivating factor behind the actions of the many ambitious men of the Republic. In Book VI of his histories, Polybius emphasizes how ambition was actively and consciously encouraged among the Roman elite by means of the elaborate funerals given to distinguished leaders. After hearing about the accomplishments of a great Roman and observing the praise heaped upon them,

by the hope of obtaining this honorable fame, which is reserved for virtue, the young men are animated to sustain all danger, in the cause of the common safety.

³⁰ Batstone and Damon, *Caesar's Civil War*, 41.

³¹ Barton, *Roman Honor*, 37: Cicero, *Tusc. Disp.* II.24.58.

For from hence it has happened, that many among the Romans have voluntarily engaged in single combat, in order to decide the fortune of an entire war. Many also have devoted themselves to inevitable death; some of them in battle, to save the lives of other citizens; and some in times of peace to rescue the whole state from destruction. Others again, who have been invested with the highest dignities have, in defiance of all law and customs, condemned their own sons to die; showing greater regard to the advantage of their country, than to the bonds of nature, and the closest ties of kindred.³²

However, Polybius neglects to mention how this effort to cultivate excellence, while intended to benefit the greater good, often resulted in unchecked ambition.³³ In the next chapter, I will show how Sallust exploits the competitions for excellence among the Roman aristocracy to demonstrate the presence of personal *ambitio* in Roman society from its beginning. When viewed within the context of personal honor, Caesar's march on Rome could be understood as personal vindication, a private response to a private problem. Yet if this were simply the case, the ambition and sense of *dignitas* which Caesar felt had been attacked were foundational to Roman politics, and Caesar could not be blamed for wanting to set his reputation right.³⁴

Through his stylistic and structural framing of the narrative, Caesar makes the private dispute between him and Pompey into a conflict with broad public consequences. In the tradition of the military *commentarius*, Caesar's *Bellum Civile* reads both as a record of events, *res gestae*, and as a defense of his actions. Unlike his *Bellum Gallicum*, Caesar's *Bellum Civile* was written after the fact, during his dictatorship. As such, its place in Caesar's political agenda is

³² Polybius, *Histories*, trans. W.R. Paton, Loeb Classical Library, VI.54.3-5. Also, this passage alludes to the story of Brutus having his sons executed for plotting against the Republic. For a discussion of the Brutus episode, see below, pp. 50-1.

³³ Matthew Fox explains the significance of the relationship between *nobilitas*, history and memory, and the *imagines* of aristocratic funerals: "This is an aristocratic world with a monopoly on historical memory that was not just about passive continuation of tradition, but rather about the propagation of its own social position, *nobilitas*, through public display, including the display of historical narrative given in speeches. *Imagines* and historical narrative, therefore, both luster around the performance of the funeral rites: there is an intimate connection between death, commemoration, and the incorporation of the individual into a tradition of public glory" *Cicero's Philosophy of History* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 157.

³⁴ See above p. 19, n. 26.

fundamental.³⁵ He is justifying his actions in the civil war after the fact, and also justifying his position as dictator. Caesar is crafting an argument that Pompey was the one conspiring to bring down the *res publica*, not himself. It will be expedient to point out here that, since *Bellum Civile* was not finished or published, it must have ceased to be a useful political tool.³⁶ Caesar realized that his march on Rome was not just crisis management or an answer to a specific emergency that threatened the security of the Republic. As Harriet Flower explains, the Republic had already ceased to be.³⁷

Caesar's March on Rome: Novus or Normal?

The loss of *dignitas*, like the one Caesar claims to suffer, inflicted by an unavenged *iniuria*, could last forever and could destroy one's career and identity.³⁸ Thus, Romans were particularly sensitive to insult and *iniuria*.³⁹ However, in the Late Republic, many contests had become unequal; many Romans did not stand a fighting chance to defend their worth. This inequality would only worsen. Before marching on Rome, Caesar asserts that Pompey "wanted no one to be an equal with him in terms of dignity."⁴⁰ Thus, in his narrative, Caesar paints his actions as his only means of defending his *dignitas* and protecting the Republic from the threat of

³⁵ The argument of Batstone and Damon is essential here and forms the basis of my understanding of the political nature of the work and how that dictates the time to which it can be dated, "Choices: Genre, Content, Style," in *Caesar's Civil War*, 8-32.

³⁶ Batstone and Damon, *Caesar's Civil War*, 32: "If we are right, *Caesar's Civil War* captures the extraordinary potential of a transformative moment in history. He begins by articulating from his perspective the causes of war and projecting policies that will restore the republic to the Senate and the Roman People; he ends because those very policies have become irrelevant in a new world in which he was now coterminous with the state, the man to whom the Senate and the Roman People looked for safety or tyranny."

³⁷ Flower, *Roman Republics*, 161-4.

³⁸ See Barton, *Roman Honor*, 37-8; 88-89.

³⁹ *Ibid.*, 74.

⁴⁰ *neminem dignitate secum exaequari volebat* (I.4); Lucan will pick up on this point in *Pharsalia*: *nec quemquam iam ferre potest Caesarue priorem/Pompeiusue parem*. "Neither is Caesar able to endure a superior, nor Pompey an equal" (I.125-6).

Pompey. This obsession with *dignitas* and personal *iniuria*, as I shall demonstrate in the following chapters, is a common motivating factor for ambitious elite men marching on Rome. Indeed, this ambition, actively cultivated at Rome among the elite, as evidenced by the funerals described by Polybius and Cicero's letters about his desire for a triumph,⁴¹ is part of the paradox of the Republic. As Cicero described in *De Republica* II.23-24, the founding fathers of Rome recognized that some level of equality and a level playing field were necessary to maintain political stability. However, cultivating ambitious individuals as military leaders could only lead to self-destruction. Cicero himself admits that he is ambitious to receive recognition from the Roman people in order to redeem himself after the insult of exile.⁴² Such concern with personal recognition, especially on the part of one of Rome's most ostensibly Republican politicians, is problematic. As I shall show in the following chapters, Caesar's own account of his march on Rome lays the groundwork for Sallust's *Catiline* and Livy's *Coriolanus*. Although the events depicted in these other narratives predate Caesar's march on Rome, the writers have no choice but to view their subject material through the lens of post-Caesarian Rome. After examining how Sallust and Livy treat the issues of *ambitio*, *iniuria*, and *dignitas* in the conceptualization of civil strife at Rome, I will show how, through direct references to Caesar, Livy uses the *Coriolanus* episode as a way of paving the way for establishing Caesar's civil war as a new, imperial foundation story.

⁴¹ Cicero, *Letters to His Friends*, Letter 110 (XV.4.13-14). See p. 7 above.

⁴² *ipsam quidem gloriam per se numquam putavi expetendam...idem post iniuriam acceptam...studui quam ornatissima senatus populi que Romani de me iudicia intercedere.* "Glory in and for itself never seemed to me worth the pursuing...after the wrong I suffered...I have been ambitious to receive tokens of esteem, the more flattering the better, from the Senate and the People of Rome" (Cic. *Letters to His Friends*, trans. Shackelton Bailey, XV.4.13).

III. Sallust's *Bellum Catilinae*: Impoverished, Yet Ambitious, Romans

Gloria as the Goal

Sallust opens his *Bellum Catilinae* not with a statement about Catiline, or Rome, or politics, but with a statement about the most basic desire of all men (*omnis homines*). Sallust asserts that “it is necessary that all men who desire to surpass the rest of the animals strive with the greatest might that they not pass through life in silence, as flocks do, whom nature fashioned face-down and obedient to their bellies.”¹ With this thesis, Sallust sets about his narrative of one man, Catiline, who wished to distinguish himself and not pass through his life *silentio*. In his chapter “Word At War: The Prequel,” William Batstone points out that Catiline, to some extent “enacts Sallustian virtue,” by striving to “win fame by the exercise of *ingenium*.”² Yet, as Sallust ultimately argues, Catiline did not use the proper means (*artae*) to distinguish himself.³ In this chapter, I discuss how Sallust shows Catiline to be the product of the political circumstances at Rome, which were the result of an increase in wealth and luxury among the Roman elite. These political circumstances and Catiline’s place within them, I contend, were very much a consequence of the centuries-long Roman emphasis on the need for aristocratic men to achieve *gloria*.

As demonstrated in Sallust’s introductory sentence above, the goal of life for an elite Roman male was to achieve some level of *gloria* or *fama*. In the preface to *Bellum Catilinae*,

¹ *Omnis homines qui sese student praestare ceteris animalibus summa ope niti decet ne vitam silentio transeant veluti pecora, quae natura prona atque ventri oboedientia finxit* (I.1).

² Batstone, “Word At War: The Prequel,” in *Citizens of Discord: Rome and Its Civil Wars*, eds. Brian Breed, Cynthia Damon, and Andreola Rossi (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 64.

³ Earl gives certain stipulations as to the proper manner of winning *gloria*, particularly in his chapter “‘Virtus’ As An Aristocratic Ideal,” *The Political Thought of Sallust* (Chicago: Argonaut, Inc., 1966), 18-27.

Sallust immediately begins discussing the best ways for men to achieve *gloria*. After going through the various ways that kings have tried to achieve balance between physical and mental prowess,⁴ Sallust explains that only the man “who, serious about some activity, seeks the fame of an illustrious deed or a noble skill” truly lives.⁵ All other men, who fail to distinguish themselves and do not achieve fame, in Sallust’s mind, are not worth his while. D.C. Earl connects Sallust’s emphasis on the need to have one’s actions remembered with the Roman obsession with *gloria*. He writes that “the Roman aristocratic ideal, in which *gloria* in *memoria* was secured after one’s achievements during life by the *laudatio* and *elogium* at death, by one’s *imago* and by one’s continuing good name preserved in the family and aristocratic circle.”⁶ It is from this culture and context of contest that Catiline came.

Sallust makes a half-hearted attempt at reconciling the goals of *gloria*, *honores*, and *memoria* with the need within the Republic to promote the common good. After a discussion of the various avenues by which one might achieve greatness, Sallust makes the broad and vague assertion that “It is noble to act well for the *res publica*, also to speak well is not out of place; both in peace and in war is it possible to become renown.”⁷ The awkward emphasis on speaking well (*bene dicere*) is, on the most obvious level, a defense of Sallust’s own inchoate writing career, which he took up after “my weak youth began to be held among such vices, corrupted by ambition.”⁸ Sallust sees writing history as a possible means to ensure his *fama* by serving the

⁴ *sed nostra omnis vis in animi et corpore sita est* “but our strength is held in the mind and in the body” (I.2).

⁵ *Verum enimvero is demum mihi vivere atque frui anima videtur, qui aliquo negotio intentus praeclari facinoris aut artis bonae famam quaerit.* “To be sure, truly only the one, who by serious about some activity, seeks the fame of an illustrious deed or a noble skill seems to me to live and to profit from his spirit” (II.8).

⁶ D.C. Earl, *The Political Thought of Sallust*, 8-9.

⁷ *Pulchrum est bene facere rei publicae, etiam bene dicere haud absurdum est; vel pace vel bello clarum fieri licet* (III.1). Horace echoes this in his Ode III.2.13: *Dulce et decorum est pro patria mori*. “It is sweet and proper to die for one’s fatherland.”

⁸ *tamen inter tanta vitia imbecilla aetas ambitione corrupta tenebatur* (III.4).

Republic and not passing through life *silentio*. Yet, his work, which purports to tell of deeds,⁹ is actually lacking in action. For the most part, character's words (*verba*) prove to be as important as their deeds (*facta*). They use speeches to persuade, to incite, and to take a stand, whereas very little action occurs. In fact, close attention to the level of threat posed by Catiline reveals that, in reality, the violent potential of the conspiracy to cause physical and military harm did not pose as much of a threat to Rome as did Catiline's ideology.¹⁰ Words and ideas play a more significant role than deeds and actions, as the plans (*consilia*) against the Republic constitute the most threatening aspect of the conspiracy.¹¹ On the other hand, Sallust contends that *bene dicere* can contend with *bene facere* in terms of good done for the Republic. Most importantly, Sallust includes the dative *rei publicae*, narrowing his definition of how one can achieve *gloria* or *virtus*. Catiline and his contemporaries, like other figures of the Roman contest culture, are to be measured in terms of good done for the Republic. Yet Cicero himself demonstrates that the allure of personal recognition can outweigh the satisfaction of serving the *patria*.¹² Since Catiline occupied a much more defensive and desperate position than Cicero, his desire for *fama* and *gloria* pertained less to the good of the Republic, and more to his own personal ambition.

⁹ He stresses that "however, it seems that writing history is especially difficult; first, because the deeds must be equaled by their words." (*tamen in primis arduum videtur res gestas scribere; primum quod facta dictis exaequanda sunt*, III.2).

¹⁰ K.H. Waters argues vehemently against the plausibility of the conspiracy as described by Cicero and Sallust, "Cicero, Sallust, and Catiline," *Historia: Zeitschrift für Alte Geschichte* 19, No. 2 (Apr., 1970): 195-215.

¹¹ To name a few instances: it is the *opprimundae rei publicae consilium* to which Sulla's veterans are attracted (XVI.4); in the infamous blood-drinking scene, Catiline reveals *consilium suum* to his co-conspirators (XXII.2); the *plebs* have an about-face and condemn the *consilia* of Catiline at XLVIII.1; Caesar shies away from a *novum consilium* for punishing the conspirators at LI.8.

¹² Cicero, *Letters to His Friends*, Letter 110 (XV.4.13), Shackelton Bailey, trans.: *ipsam quidem gloriam per se numquam putavi expetendam...idem post iniuriam acceptam...studui quam ornatissima senatus populi que Romani de me iudicia intercedere*. "Glory in and for itself never seemed to me worth the pursuing...but after the wrong I suffered...I have been ambitious to receive tokens of esteem, the more flattering the better, from the Senate and the People of Rome." See above, pp. 7, 23.

Ambitio and its Role in the Republic

At first glance, Sallust paints earlier Roman history in a decidedly idealistic way. Yet, if one examines the work closer, it is possible to trace the same problems and tensions throughout much of Roman history—particularly *ambitio*, *cupido*, and *avaritia*. Nevertheless, Sallust refuses to recognize the continuity of these tensions and leaves his reader unsure as to whether they actually exist or not. By bringing up these unresolved tensions, Sallust seems to be asking, as William Batstone does: “Is the quest for *gloria*, for *libertas*, for *dignitas* a Roman quest or one that sets Roman against Roman?”¹³

The first sign of trouble occurs, Sallust writes, “after the state had grown in citizens, in customs, in fields, and seemed prosperous enough and strong enough,” at which point, “just as many affairs of mortals go, envy arose, on account of their opulence.”¹⁴ While this initial *invidia* arose on the part of Rome’s neighbors who were covetous of Rome’s riches and actually allowed the Romans to unite against a common enemy, Sallust clearly indicates *opulentia* as the factor that caused the problem. In describing early Romans, Sallust portrays them as blameless, incorruptible, and all working in service of the *res publica*: “To such men, no labor was unaccustomed, no place was at all dark or steep, no armed enemy was scary; virtue was the master of all. But the greatest contest for glory was among themselves.”¹⁵ They had no regard for riches—“they were desirous of praise, generous with money; they wished for huge glory, honest riches.”¹⁶ While on the surface Sallust appears to be describing a Golden Age of virtue

¹³ Batstone, “Word At War: The Prequel,” 65.

¹⁴ *sed postquam res eorum civibus, moribus, agris aucta, satis prospera satisque pollens videbatur, sicuti pleraque mortalium habentur, invidia ex opulentia orta est* (VI.4).

¹⁵ *Igitur talibus viris non labor insolitus, non locus ullus asper aut arduus erat, non armatus hostis formidulosus; virtus omnia domuerat. Sed gloriae maximum certamen inter ipsos erat* (VII.5).

¹⁶ *Laudis avidi, pecuniae liberalis errant; gloriam ingentem, divitias volebant* (VII.6).

and righteousness, these men are still *avid* and had a *maximum certamen inter ipsos*. From the beginning, the greatest threat to Rome lay within. Batstone argues that Sallust adds to the recognition, on the part of Romans, of the horror of their history of civil war. He writes that Sallust's "sense of lack of closure," his "sense that the rhetoric of both sides is deadly," and his "sense of the depth of the problem: that it goes back beyond Carthage to something in the nature of history and the nature of Rome" all contribute to an awareness that a culture built on contest and ambition is not sustainable.¹⁷ The possibility of civil conflict lies hidden throughout Sallust's work. In discussing the relative lack of historical writing heralding the deeds of various Romans when compared with Greek writings, Sallust explains that no Roman had an interest in recording the great deeds of another but rather wanted his own deeds to be praised above all.¹⁸ Here, as at VII.6,¹⁹ the subversive message is that the Roman elite was more concerned with self-aggrandizement than giving credit where it was due. Much like the *maximum certamen inter ipsos*, this desire to have one's own deeds praised above all others has the potential to create real trouble. Moreover, this assertion about history writing at Rome contradicts Sallust's emphasis on *bene dicere*. Apparently, only recently was the ability to speak and write in service to the Republic recognized.

In introducing what he presents as the second period of turmoil at Rome, which appears to be sometime after the Third Punic War, Sallust again shows it to be within the context of Rome's greatness, strength, and wealth.²⁰ However, at this time, "lust for first riches, then power

¹⁷ Batstone, "Word At War: The Prequel," 66.

¹⁸ *optimus quisque facere quam dicere, sua ab aliis benefacta laudari quam ipse aliorum narrare malebat*. "Each great man preferred to act rather than to speak, and that his own services be praised by others rather than that he himself narrate the services of others" (VIII.5).

¹⁹ *Sed gloriae maximum certamen inter ipsos erat; se quisque hostem ferire, murum ascendere, conspici dum tale facinus faceret, properabat*. "But the greatest contest for glory was among themselves: each man was hastening to strike the enemy, to ascend the wall, to be seen while he did such a deed" (VII.6). See above, p. 28, n. 16.

²⁰ *Sed ubi labore atque iustitia res publica crevit, reges magni bello domiti, nationes ferae et populi ingentes vi subacti, Carthago aemula imperi Romani ab stripe interiit* "But when the *res publica* had grown in labor and in

grew” and not among hostile enemies, but among Roman citizens.²¹ Among other evils, *ambitio* rears its ugly head.²² Sallust here presents Romans evaluating relationships “not by their own value, but by their advantage” as a new development.²³ While this apparent vice of self-interested action may have newly spread to interpersonal relationships, as I discussed above with regard to Sallust’s evaluation of Roman laudatory history, acting out of self-interest is not new to Romans.²⁴ Yet, Sallust presents self-interested action as a new development. Likewise, in his discussion the problem of *ambitio* at Rome, Sallust treats the topic as though it has not surfaced before. He writes: “But at first, ambition more than avarice began to exercise the minds of men, which although a vice, was nearer to a virtue. For the noble and the ignoble equally wish for themselves glory, honor, and power; but one [the noble] strives by the true path, but because noble skills are lacking to this one [the ignoble], he contends by means of tricks and deceits.”²⁵ This description of the place of *ambitio* in Roman society rings true with much of the rest of the preface; Sallust has made it clear that *gloria*, *honores*, and *imperium* are the things for which Romans strive, and that this has resulted at times in *maximum certamen*. Nevertheless, Sallust connects *ambitio* and *gloria* and *honores* only after he has established the latter terms as positive and essential to the life of the Roman elite. Even the inclusion of the adverb *primo*, the meaning of which can encompass “at first, originally, to begin with; first of all”²⁶ indicates that Sallust recognizes the not-newness of *ambitio* in Roman society. This subtle and subversive presence of

justice, the great kings conquered by war, fierce nations and huge peoples subdued by force, and Carthage, the rival of the Roman empire, had been ruined from the root up...” (XI.1).

²¹ *Igitur primo pecuniae, deinde imperi cupido crevit* (X.3).

²² X.5. For more on *ambitio* vs. *avaritia* See Duane Conley, “Interpretation of Sallust Catiline 10.1—11.3,” *Classical Philology* 76, No. 2 (April, 1981): 121-125.

²³ *non ex re sed ex commodo* (X.5).

²⁴ See above, p. 29, n. 15, 16; p. 29, n. 19.

²⁵ *Sed primo magis ambitio quam avaritia animos hominum exercebat, quod tamen vitium propius virtutem. Nam gloriam, honorem, imperium bonus et ignavus aequae sibi exoptant; sed ille vera via nititur, huic quia bonae artes desunt, dolis atque fallaciis contendit* (XI.1).

²⁶ *OLD*, s.v. “primo,” definition 1.

ambitio at first (*primo*) might seem at odds with Sallust's idealized portrait of earlier Roman history. In his article addressing the incongruities in how Sallust explains the rise of *ambitio* and *avaritia* in Roman society, Duane Conley offers the diagnosis of the “*avaritia-ambitio* syndrome.” He explains how “the author's mind is naturally led by the transition from the fall of Carthage and the beginning of Rome's supremacy” to the *avaritia-ambitio* syndrome which characterized “the period of degeneration as a whole.”²⁷ Conley emphasizes that the onset of the two parts of the syndrome has more importance together than the rise of either of the two vices separately.

I believe that, to some degree, an answer to the problem of *ambitio* at Rome lies in Thucydides' *Peloponnesian War*. In his *Sallust*, Ronald Syme suggests Thucydides as Sallust's literary model, both in terms of style—“translation or adaptation of phrases”—and in terms of subject matter—“to produce an equivalence of manner and atmosphere.”²⁸ At II.65, after recording the death of the Athenian statesman Pericles, Thucydides explains the dissolution of Athenian unity and policy that followed. He writes:

The causes of this are not far to seek. Pericles indeed, by his rank, ability, and known integrity, was enabled to exercise an independent control over the multitude—in short, to lead them instead of being led by them... With his successors it was different. More on a level with one another, and each grasping at supremacy, they ended by committing even the conduct of state affairs to the whims of the multitude.²⁹

According to Thucydides, the condition of equality, a condition actively cultivated among the Roman elite³⁰ produced a detrimental effect on Athenian governance, and Caesar's rationale for

²⁷ Conley, “The Interpretation of Sallust Catiline 10.1-11.3,” 124.

²⁸ Syme, *Sallust* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1964), 56.

²⁹ Thucydides, *Peloponnesian War*, trans. Robert B. Strassler, II.65.8-10.

³⁰ *Igitur domi militiaeque boni mores colebantur, Concordia maxuma, minuma avaritia erat, ius bonumque apud eos non legibus magis quam natura valebat.* “Therefore, at home and abroad, good character was cultivated, there was the greatest concord, and minimal avarice, justice and the good were strong among them, not by laws more than by nature” (IX.1).

the civil war between him and Pompey resonates of Thucydides' thinking.³¹ Moreover, Sallust's description of the *maximum certamen inter ipsos* echoes Thucydides' warning about the competitions that emerge in an equal society. Although the only appropriate way for Roman elite men to distinguish themselves lay in service to the *res publica*,³² the desire among the Roman elite to outdo one another in terms of valor on the battlefield easily blurred into *imperi cupido*.³³

Catiline: Sulla's Veteran Turned Popularis

A veteran of Sulla's army, Catiline came from an old noble family that had fallen into ignominy and disrepute. Catiline, unlike his contemporaries Pompey and Crassus, failed to foster a distinguished political career. After serving as praetor in Africa, he was tried upon his return for extortion and was, as Gruen explains, "under a cloud on more than one count."³⁴ Such a political loss fits into Carlin Barton's discussion of "the stimulus of shame." She argues that the shame of falling short of one's own lot or expectations often acted as "a goad to achievement."³⁵ Waters, on the other hand, is careful to mention that "the first, and undoubtedly

³¹ *ab inimicis Caesaris incitatus et quod neminem dignitate secum exaequari volebat*, "[Pompey was] stirred up by the enemies of Caesar and because he wanted that no one be his equal in terms of dignity" (I.4).

³² Although Sallust goes to lengths to reassure his readers that *gloria* can be attained *vel pace vel bello* (III.1), the fact of the matter remains that, as D.C. Earl emphasizes, *virtus* was an essential part of Sallust's programme. *Virtus* was a qualification necessary for winning *gloria*, which could be done by performing *egregia facinora* by means of an *ingenium* in possession of *bonae artes*. *Virtus*, totally dependent on the notion of *vir*, denotes the achievement of whatever *vires* were supposed to do. If we are to understand the role of a *vir* as fighting as a soldier, as Earl points out, "then his proper activity is to obey discipline and to fight bravely," *The Political Thought of Sallust* (16). While Earl's argument makes room for other ways for *vires* to distinguish themselves (like politics or his own profession of history writing), the fact of the matter remains that the majority of the distinguished men and politicians of Catiline's day (and Sallust's) were initially military men. I take Sallust's assertion that *virtus* can be achieved in a variety of arenas to be more prescriptive and suggestive rather than descriptive of the situation at hand.

³³ X.3.

³⁴ Gruen, *The Last Generation of the Roman Republic* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1974), 217. In the chapter "The Consuls and Consular Elections," Gruen explains a good deal of the political context.

³⁵ Barton, *Roman Honor*, 232-3.

genuine, aim of Catiline was to secure the consulship.”³⁶ Primarily, it seems, Catiline wanted to distinguish himself and gain legitimate political power. Yet, as a victim/product of his times, he lacked the appropriate means to do so and resorted to the *malae artes* that abounded in Roman society in the mid-1st century BC. Catiline’s desire to distinguish himself in such political conditions points to the negative impact of a contest culture in Rome. In the years leading up to Catiline’s conspiracy, the political situation at Rome had reached new heights of tension. Pompey had cleared the Mediterranean of pirates using unprecedented *imperium* which was given to him by the senate in 66 BC, and at the time of the conspiracy, he was wrapping up a very profitable war against Mithradates VI in the East.³⁷ Given the unprecedented and unconstitutional nature of Pompey’s political career,³⁸ no one could be certain what the nature of his return to Rome might be; the possibility of another general seizing power in the capitol city seemed looming.³⁹ M. Licinius Crassus, a veteran commander of Sulla’s army who shared the consulship with Pompey in 70 BC, had become a powerful force at Rome primarily through his efforts and schemes to increase his personal wealth, especially since Pompey had been away in the East. Crassus’ connections to Catiline and his conspiracy (or conspiracies) are heavily debated.⁴⁰ At the very least, we must assume that Crassus’ involvement in the conspiracy, even

³⁶ Waters, “Cicero, Sallust, and Catiline,” 197. In arguing that the repute of Catiline’s conspiracy comes primarily from Cicero’s own self-aggrandizement and warmongering, Waters provides a very sensible explanation of what Catiline’s plans and aims probably actually were.

³⁷ *Oxford Classical Dictionary*, s.v. “Pompey.”

³⁸ *OCD*, s.v. “Pompey.” Also, see Gruen, *The Last Generation of the Roman Republic*. Pompey’s emergence from the ranks of Sulla’s army raised the possibility of a connection between the two men, a connection exploited by his detractors (among them, eventually, in the *Bellum Civile*, Julius Caesar).

³⁹ Syme, *Sallust*, 19. Additionally, here again, the early chapters of Syme’s *Roman Revolution* sets the scene.

⁴⁰ Earl mentions Suetonius and Cicero, among others, who, with varying degrees of subtlety, implicate Caesar and Crassus. Earl seems to suggest that, while many believe the *BC* to have been written as a political pamphlet exonerating Caesar, Sallust in no way attempts to do the same for Crassus, *The Political Thought of Sallust* (82-85, 89). Syme, on the other hand, merely calls attention to the fact that Sallust “alludes to the distrust he incurred,” *Sallust* (23). Syme also mentions Crassus’ alleged involvement (100, 103-104), while not coming down on either side of the debate. Pagán, in her chapter on Catiline’s conspiracy, suggests a close alliance between Crassus and Catiline until his loss to Cicero in the elections for 63 BC, at which point “Crassus thereupon discarded the defeated Catiline, who nonetheless persisted in his bid for the consulship” *Conspiracy Narratives in Roman History* (30).

just his tacit approval or support, was not inconceivable to Sallust's audience. The career of Caesar, another figure with possible shadowy connections to Catiline,⁴¹ was on a steady incline, and in 63 BC, he was elected *pontifex maximus*, the result of a great deal of bribery.⁴² As evidenced by the careers of Crassus and Caesar, the political importance of disposable amounts of money was undeniable. Despite Caesar's insistence that he was resisting the power of the elite few,⁴³ political influence at Rome had become increasingly concentrated.

The circumstances at Rome, which Sallust condemns so vehemently, are, according to Sallust, the result of the reign of Sulla.⁴⁴ He mentions in his initial description of Catiline that, "since his youth, internal wars, murders, plunders, and civil strife were welcome, and there he spent his youth," clearly referencing Catiline's involvement in Sulla's army.⁴⁵ One assumes that, like Crassus and Pompey, having gone with Sulla to the East, Catiline had been exposed to the

Sallust: *Erant praeterea complures paulo occultius consili huiusce participes nobiles, quos magis dominationis spe hortabatur quam inopia aut alia necessitudo.* "There were, in addition, a good many nobles who took part in this plan a little more secretly, whom a great hope of domination was encouraging more than want or some other compulsion" (XVII.5); *Fuere item ea tempestate qui crederent M. Licinium Crassum non ignarum eius consili fuisse; quia Cn. Pompeius invisus ipsi magnum exercitum ductabat, cuiusve opes voluisse contra illius potentiam crescere, simul confisum, si coniuratio valuisset, facile apud illos principem se fore.* "There were also, at that time, those who believed that M. Licinius Crassus had not been ignorant of that plan; because Gn. Pompeius, regarded by him with envy, was leading his own large army, that he had wished to grow his own power in response to his riches, at the same time Crassus trusted that, if the plot had prevailed, easily he would have been the leading one among them" (XVII.7).

⁴¹ As discussed in Syme, *Sallust*, 2-3 and Earl, *The Political Thought of Sallust*, 2-3, many earlier scholars believed that Sallust wrote from a solely political, propagandistic point of view, in favor of Caesar. Both writers suggest a more nuanced approach to reading Sallust. Batston provides a great discussion of Caesar's role within Sallust's narrative, particularly focusing on the synkrisis of the debate between Caesar and Cato, in "The Antithesis of Virtue." Waters, in "Cicero, Sallust, and Catiline," blames Cicero nearly entirely for blowing the nature of the entire conspiracy way out of proportion and explores reasons why Cicero may have wanted to implicate Caesar and/or Crassus (206-208). However, Waters places more emphasis on Cicero's manipulation of the situation than on Sallust's own motives for writing his treatise.

⁴² Syme, *Sallust*, 19-20.

⁴³ For example: *omnia haec iam pridem contra se parari; in se novi generis imperia constitui, ut idem ad portas urbanis praesideat rebus et duas bellicosissimas provincias absens tot annis obtineat.* He continues: *in se iura magistratuum commutari, ne ex praetura et consulatu, ut semper, sed per paucos probati et electi in provincias mittantur.* "Against him, the rights of the magistrates were altered that they not, after the praetorship and the consulate be sent into the provinces, approved and selected by the few" (I.85).

⁴⁴ Sallust lays a good deal of blame on Sulla for the degradation of Rome. *Sed postquam L. Sulla armis recepta res publica bonis initiis malos eventus habuit.* "After L. Sulla, with the *res publica* taken by arms, managed evil outcomes from good beginnings," society at Rome devolved into crime, intrigue, envy, and lust (XI.4).

⁴⁵ *Huic ab adulescentia bella intestina, caedes, rapinae, discordia civilis grata fuere, ibique iuventutem suam exercuit* (V.2).

“charming and pleasure-filled places” there and had begun “to love, to drink; to wonder at statues, painted pictures, embossed vases; to seize these things in private and in public, to despoil shrines, to pollute all things sacred and profane.”⁴⁶ This exposure to and influx of wealth lies at the heart of Sallust’s explanation of the degeneration of Roman morality. In Sallust’s view, Sulla is to blame for creating the conditions in which a figure like Catiline became a possibility. Sulla was the 1st century’s model “rogue male,” and Catiline enlists as his co-conspirators men who remembered and longed for successes similar to those of Sulla.⁴⁷

However, many of Catiline’s co-conspirators had been left behind in post-Sullan Rome. Although a great influx of wealth had come from the East with Sulla’s army, it had not been evenly distributed, and in order to keep up with their social and political counterparts, many from Rome’s elite had driven themselves into enormous amounts of debt.⁴⁸ In addition, the urban poor continued to suffer, as many of Sulla’s lower-ranking veterans, unable to acquire land in the countryside or unsuccessful at cultivating it, joined the ranks of those trying to survive in the city.⁴⁹ Among the riffraff and undesirables listed by Sallust as Catiline’s associates, one finds those “whoever—shameless, gluttonous, a gambler—with his hand, his belly, or his penis had wasted noble patrimonies, and whoever had run up a terribly great debt, by which a shame or an outrage might be atoned for... finally, all those whom shame, extreme poverty, or a guilty mind

⁴⁶ *Loca amoena, voluptaria facile in otio ferocis militum animos molliverant. Ibi primum insuevit exercitus populi Romania mare, potare; signa, tabulas pictas, vasa caelata mirari; ea privatim et publice rapere, delubra spoliare, sacra profanaque omnia polluere* (XI.6).

⁴⁷ *Deinde multi memores Sullanae victoriae, quod ex gregariis militibus alios senatores videbant, alios ita divites ut regio victu atque cultu aetatem agerent, sibi quisque, si in armis foret, ex Victoria talia sperabant.* “Then, mindful of Sulla’s victory, because they saw some changed from common soldiers to senators, others became so rich that they lived out their lives in a kingly lifestyle and fashion, each was hoping for such victories for himself, if he should take up arms” (XXXVII.6).

⁴⁸ Even Caesar depended on Crassus to bail him out of debt.

⁴⁹ For a discussion of Catiline’s supporters among the urban *plebs* and the disenfranchised nobles, see Waters, “Cicero, Sallust, and Catiline,” 204-208, Vassaly, “Characterization and complexity: Caesar, Sallust, and Livy” 252-254, and Earl, *The Political Thought of Sallust*, 90-92.

disturbed.”⁵⁰ These characters stand out more than the generic murderers, patricides, and criminals. Sallust describes what caused Catiline and his co-conspirators to develop their revolutionary ideas:

Confident in these friends and companions, Catiline, likewise because he had a great amount of debt throughout all the lands, and because many soldiers of Sulla, having spent their part of the booty lavishly, and remembering their old victory, were longing for a civil war, conceived a plan for overthrowing the *res publica*. There was no army in Italy; Gnaeus Pompey was waging war in the furthest lands; Catiline himself had a great hope of seeking the consulship; the senate was not at all alert; all affairs were safe and tranquil, but this was, by all means, the opportunity for Catiline.⁵¹

A cornerstone of Catiline’s apparent agenda is the elimination of the crippling debt and uneven distribution of wealth that had resulted from Sulla’s reign.⁵² Catiline advertises his conspiracy as a means of acquiring “riches, distinction, glory.”⁵³ In his first speech, Catiline deplores the influx of wealth among the Roman elite, “while for us, money is lacking us even for the necessities of life for our families.”⁵⁴ Without wealth, impoverished Romans, both members of the elite and the urban *plebs*, lacked the means to achieve any sort of *gloria*, *honores*, *memoria*, or *dignitas*. Their lives were, according to Sallust’s own standards, meaningless.⁵⁵

⁵⁰ *Nam quicumque impudicus, ganeo, aleator, manu ventre, pene bona patria laceraverat, quique alienum aes grande conflaverat, quo flagitium aut facinus redimeret...postremo omnes quos flagitium, egestas, conscius animus exagitabat...* (XIV.2-3).

⁵¹ *Eis amicis sociisque confisus Catilina, simul quod aes alienum per omnis terras ingens erat et quod plerique Sullani milites largius suo usi rapinarum et victoriae veteris memores civile bellum exoptabant, opprimundae rei publicae consilium cepit. In Italia nullus exercitus, Cn. Pompeius in extremis terries bellum gerebat; ipsi consulatum petenti magna spes, senatus nihil sane intentus; tutae tranquillaeque res omnes, sed ea prorsus opportuna Catilinae.* (XVI.4).

⁵² Waters, “Cicero, Sallust, and Catiline,” 204-207 provides a good discussion, as does Syme, both in the early chapters of *The Roman Revolution* and in “The Political Scene,” *Sallust*, 16-28.

⁵³ *divitiae, decus, gloria* (XX.14); *Res, tempus, pericula, egestas, belli spolia magna magis quam oratio mea vos hortantur*. “The affair, the time, the dangers, the poverty, the magnificent spoils of war urge you on more than my speech” (XX.15).

⁵⁴ *nobis rem familiarem etiam ad necessaria deese?* (XX.11).

⁵⁵ See above, p. 26, n. 5. See also Barton, “The Moment of Truth in Ancient Rome: Honor and Embodiment in a Contest Culture,” *Roman Honor*, 29-130 for a discussion on the importance of achieving *gloria* and *honor*, but especially regarding Sallust and Catiline (48-9).

On the other hand, “Catiline promised the cancellation of debts, the proscription of the rich, magistracies, priesthoods, plunder, and all other things which war and the wantonness of the victors brings.”⁵⁶ By calling for the cancellation of debts, Catiline was demanding literally “new tablets” (*tabulae novae*). Caesar, on the other hand, did not promise *tabulae novae* to his supporters, even though at times they clamored for it. Suetonius reports that, despite other progressive measures he forwarded, “as to the debts, by frustrating the expectation of debt cancellation, which had been frequently stirred up,” Caesar allowed debtors to repay their creditors according to whatever arrangement had been worked out before the civil war.⁵⁷ Caesar himself states that he considered the best way “to lift and to minimize the fear of the cancellation of debts” once he has consolidated control at Rome. As opposed to Catiline, Caesar tried to distance himself from ideas of *novitas* or an overly revolutionary program. This vocabulary brings to mind the *novitate periculi* Sallust alludes to at IV.4.

A Caesarian Model?

Sallust, in explaining how he chose his subject matter, points out that the conspiracy was “memorable because of the newness of the crime and of its danger.”⁵⁸ However, Catiline’s actions and motivations were in no way new or unprecedented. Catiline was not the first man,

⁵⁶ *Tum Catilina polliceri tabulas novas, proscriptionem locupletium, magistratus, sacerdotia, rapinas, alia omnia quae bellum atque lubido victorum fert* (XXI.2); Cicero also references this promise that Catiline made in 2nd *Catilinarian* VIII.

⁵⁷ *De pecuniis mutuis disiecta novarum tabularum expectatione, quae crebro movebatur, decrevit tandem, ut debitores creditoribus satis facerent per aestimationem possessionum, quanti quasque ante civile bellum comparassent, deducto summae aeris alieni, si quid usurae nomine numeratum aut perscriptum fuisset; qua condicione quarta pars fere crediti deperibat* (Suet. XLII.2, trans. J.C. Rolfe); *ad timorem novarum tabularum tollendum minuendumve* (Caesar, *Bellum Civile*, III.1).

⁵⁸ *memorable...sceleris atque periculi novitate* (IV.4); *OLD*, s.v. “*nouitas*” 1: The fact or condition of having come into existence for the first time, newness, novelty; an innovation. 2: The fact of not having been known or met with before, unfamiliarity; unusual or unexampled character; a strange phenomenon or occurrence. 3: Unexpectedness; something unexpected; a surprise. 4: The state of being different from or replacing what previously existed; a fresh development, phenomenon, etc. 5: the state of not having existed long, newness, freshness.

even of the 1st century BC, to turn an army against Rome, and Sallust was writing with at least one precedent-setting narrative of civil strife in mind, that of Caesar's *Bellum Civile*. However, as opposed to Caesar and Sulla, who marched on Rome with armies they had been leading in the provinces, Catiline had no *imperium* at all, and wanted to march on Rome with an army of disillusioned private citizens. Nevertheless, when Catiline addresses his co-conspirators and associates in Chapter XX of *Bellum Catilinae*, he impresses upon them the urgency of the situation, and adopts some of the rhetorical strategies of Caesar from *Bellum Civile*:

For after the *res publica* submitted to the power, the sway, and the dominion of a few, always to them do kings and tetrarchs yield their taxes, and peoples and nations pay out their tributes; all the rest, strong, good, nobles and commoners, we have been the mob without influence, without authority, liable to them, to whom, if the *res publica* were strong, we would be a cause of alarm...to us are left dangers, electoral defeats, law suits, and dire poverty.⁵⁹

If we are to take Catiline's words at face value, they ring true with Caesar's assertion in *Bellum Civile* that he is actually the defender of the state.⁶⁰ Both Caesar and Catiline present a current state of affairs so different and corrupted from their idealized portrait of Roman history to the extent that they, in their minds, becomes justified in his actions. Moreover, in Chapter XXXV, a letter supposedly written by Catiline⁶¹ includes vocabulary, that is specifically related to Caesar's account: "Stirred up by injuries and by affronts, because I had been deprived from the fruit of my labor and my own industry, and I could not hold onto a state of dignity, I took up the public cause of the wretched ones, according to my habit."⁶² This statement again draws parallels with

⁵⁹ *Nam postquam res publica in paucorum potentium ius atque dicionem concessit, semper illis reges, tetrarchae vectigales esse, populi, nationes stipendia pendere; ceteri omnes, strenui, boni, nobiles atque ignobiles, volgus fuimus sine gratia sine auctoritate, eis obnoxii, quibus, si res publica valeret, formidini essemus...nobis reliquere pericula, repulses iudicia, egestatem* (XX.7, 8).

⁶⁰ See above, pp. 15-6.

⁶¹ *quas sibi nomine Catilinae redditas dicebat* "which he was saying had been sent to him in the name of Catiline" (XXXIV.3). At this point, Catiline was ostensibly withdrawing into exile at Massilia, having been accused of the conspiracy he was in fact planning.

⁶² *Iniuriis contumeliisque concitatus, quod fructu laboris industriaeque meae privates statum dignitatis non optinebam, publicam miserorum causam pro mea consuetudine suscepi* (XXXV.3).

the rhetoric of Caesar, with its references to *iniuriae*, *contumelia*, and *dignitas*.⁶³ The more Sallust allows Catiline to present himself, the more Catiline resembles Caesar in his own description of the civil war. However, unlike Caesar, Sallust's plans, as reported by Sallust, were not merely to influence the political events at Rome, but included setting fire to the city⁶⁴ and assassinating the consul.⁶⁵ While Waters argues that "repeated and ignominious failures to achieve even a single assassination" were "commonplace enough in Roman political annals,"⁶⁶ this is a more drastic step than Caesar's attempt to establish political control at Rome.

Catiline is careful to specify that he acted not out of his own poverty and debt, but primarily "because I was watching men be honored who were not worthy of the honor, and I was feeling that I had been alienated because of a false suspicion."⁶⁷ Barton references this passage in her discussion of the general late Republican sentiment about "the loss of a level playing field." The many citizens suffering under large amounts of debt could not hope to compete on the same level as the wealthier politicians like Crassus and Caesar. This inequality will only continue to grow in the years subsequent to Sallust's writing, to the extent that, early into the Empire, no one outside the imperial family will receive military triumphs. Much in the same way that Caesar claimed to do, Sallust's Catiline is refusing to stand by while political power became more and more concentrated in the hands of the few (*pauci*). Moreover, in the letter of Chapter XXXV, Catiline states that he is (ostensibly) going into exile "to preserve what is left of his dignity."⁶⁸

⁶³ See particularly p. 18 and p. 20 above. *omnium temporum iniurias inimicorum in se commemorat: a quibus deductum ac depravatam Pompeium queritur invidia atque obtrectatione laudis suae, cuius ipse honori et dignitati semper faverit adiutorque fuerit* (Caesar, *Bellum Civile*, I.7). Moreover, Livy's Coriolanus will complain, at various points, of *iniuria* and *contumelium*.

⁶⁴ XXIV.4.

⁶⁵ XXVIII.1.

⁶⁶ Waters, "Cicero, Sallust, and Catiline," 202.

⁶⁷ *non quia aes alienum meis nominibus ex possessionibus solvere non possem...sed quod non dignos homines honore honestatos videbam meque falsa suspitione alienatum esse sentiebam* (XXXV.3).

⁶⁸ *reliquae dignitatis conservandae* (XXXV.4).

This concern for his own *dignitas* again echoes the rationalization Julius Caesar gives for his own march on Rome.⁶⁹

Interestingly enough, Caesar speaks on his own as a character in *Bellum Catilinae*. Even more notably, he begins his oration on the punishment of the conspirators in the same way that Sallust begins his preface to the entire work. Caesar addresses his audience: “Conscript fathers, it is necessary that all men who deliberate about uncertain matters be free from hatred, friendship, anger, and sympathy.”⁷⁰ Despite this similarity to Sallust’s own prose, much of Caesar’s address comes from the material of Caesar’s *Bellum Civile*. Sallust’s Caesar, much like Caesar’s own self-representation is very concerned with his *dignitas*, *iniuriae*, and *novitas*. In his speech, Caesar warns the senators against exacting a punishment that is not fitting to their dignity.⁷¹ Batstone examines the way in which Sallust attributes *dignitas* to Caesar and Cato in his comparison of the two. He explains that *dignitas* “was the special preserve of *nobilitas*; it could be inherited from one’s ancestors; it supported one’s claim for *honores*, and itself rested upon the tenure of office.”⁷² Caesar argues that men with more *dignitas* have more to lose from *iniuriae*, since they have larger public profiles.⁷³ Thus, these men, like the senators Caesar is

⁶⁹ C.f. *hortatur, cuius imperatoris ductu VIII annis rem publicam felicissime gesserint plurimaeque proelia secunda fecerint, omnem Galliam Germaniamque pacaverint, ut eius existimationem dignitatemque ab inimicis defendant*. “He urged that they defend the judgment and dignity of him under whose command for eight years they had made the Republic most happy and had joined many favorable battles and had pacified all of Gall and Germany” (I.7). Earl points out that “If these sentiments are really Catiline’s, they, with his appeal to *libertas* in his speech to the conspirators, constitute clear proof of Sallust’s comment on the debasement of the language for selfish political ends. Caesar was later to make the defence of the *libertas* of the *respublica* and his own *dignitas* his excuse for crossing the Rubicon,” *The Political Thought of Sallust* (95).

⁷⁰ “*Omnis hominess, patres conscripti, qui de rebus dubiis consultant, ab odio, amicitia, ira atque misericordia vacuos esse decet*” (LI.1).

⁷¹ *Hoc item vobis providendum est, patres conscripti, ne plus apud vos valeat P. Lentuli et ceterorum scelus quam vostra dignitas, neu magis irae vestrae quam famae consulates*. “This also must be considered by you, conscript fathers, that the dignity and the crime of P. Lentulus and of the others not carry more weight among you than your own dignity, nor that your anger not be paid more attention than your fame” (LI.7).

⁷² Batstone, “The Antithesis of Virtue,” 19.

⁷³ *Non ita est, neque cuiquam mortalium iniuriae suae parvae videntur; multi eas gravius aequo habuere*. “It is not so, nor is there any mortal man to whom his own injuries seem insignificant” (LI.11); *Ita in maxuma fortuna minima licentia est. Neque studere neque odisse, sed minime irasci decet. Quae apud alios iracundia dicitur, ea in imperio superbia atque crudelitas appellatur*. “And so, in the greatest fortune, there is the least unrestrained

addressing, have the greatest need to use their *ingenium*, a marked Sallustian term, and to shun their passions. Lastly, Sallust's Caesar is preoccupied with his *novitas*. He argues that Silanus' proposal of executing the conspirators is "a new kind of punishment,"⁷⁴ and he urges the senate to not accept any "new plan."⁷⁵ However, Caesar's own proposal, to keep the conspirators in house arrest,⁷⁶ is itself without precedent (*novus*). Moreover, when warning against a "new kind of punishment" and a "new plan," Caesar's Sallust uses an archaic form, *novom*. In his introduction to edition and commentary to *Bellum Catilinae*, J.T. Ramsey states that Sallust "reveled in the archaic."⁷⁷ Particularly ironic is Sallust's use of an archaism to discuss "new" things. In *Bellum Catilinae*, Sallust's Caesar is engaging in the same word-slinging that Caesar's Pompey does in *Bellum Civile*.⁷⁸

In his comparison, or *synkrisis*, of Caesar and Cato,⁷⁹ Sallust points out that Caesar "wished for himself great power, an army, and a new war, where his virtue might be able to stand out."⁸⁰ Again, here, Sallust uses the archaism *novom* to describe the war for which Caesar was longing. Sallust surrounds the character of Caesar with things that are new, but uses an old word to describe them. The dative "for himself" (*sibi*) to describe Caesar's desire for war, Syme explains, contains "no hint from Sallust that Caesar in his aspirations for war and conquest was

conduct. Nor is it proper to be eager, nor to hate, and least of all to become angry. That which is called a hot temper among others, that among those in power is called haughtiness or cruelty" (LI.13-14).

⁷⁴ *genus poenae novom* (LI.19).

⁷⁵ *Hanc ego causam, patres conscripti, quo minus novom consilium capiamus, in primis magnam puto.* "I think, conscript fathers, that this is a great reason, for which we should not adopt a new plan" (LI.41).

⁷⁶ LI.43.

⁷⁷ In his commentary, Ramsey mentions how Sallust used "*vivos* and *vivom* for *vivus* and *vivum*, vid. 11.2n. *ignavos*," *Sallust's Bellum Catilinae*, edited, with introduction and commentary by J.T. Ramsey, American Philological Association Textbook Series, (Atlanta, GA: Scholars Press, 1984), 12-13.

⁷⁸ *ne nova Caesaris officia veterum suorum beneficiorum in eos memoriam expellerent*, "Not to let the new kindness of Caesar drive out the memory of his [Pompey's] old favors" (*Bellum Civile*, I.34). See p. 17 above.

⁷⁹ Batstone describes the *synkrisis* as "essentially agonistic" and "used for competitive comparison and to praise or blame," "The Antithesis of Virtue," 3.

⁸⁰ *sibi magnum imperium, exercitum, bellum novom exoptabat, ubi virtus enitescere posset* (LIV.5).

moved by any thought for the Commonwealth.”⁸¹ William Batstone raises this question within the context of his greater argument about the problem of *virtus* in the late Republic. He writes that the *synkrisis* as a whole “creates a premonition of conflicts to come,” and, in addressing Sallust’s Caesar’s desire for war, says that Caesar “is only looking for the appropriate field of action in which his *virtus* will necessarily shine.”⁸²

The exact dates for Sallust’s composition of *Bellum Catilinae* are uncertain, though most argue for sometime between 44 BC and Sallust’s death, probably in 35 BC.⁸³ Regardless of the exact dating, Sallust had already witnessed the results of Caesar’s march on Rome, and the aftermath of his assassination, before he began writing. However, Sallust’s Catiline does not have this same problem; he dies a noble death in battle, leading his army on foot.⁸⁴ While, the commander of the Roman army sat out the battle, since he was suffering from gout,⁸⁵ Catiline dies, “mindful of his birth and of his former dignity,” having plunged ahead past his own front lines, and falling in the fight, as did all the other citizens of free birth.⁸⁶ Sallust’s Catiline is preoccupied with his *dignitas* up until his demise. As Caesar’s historical predecessor, Catiline is, to some extent, a retroactive model Caesar, although Sallust wrote after Caesar. As I shall discuss in the next chapter, Livy builds on this phenomenon of retroactive literary modeling with his characterization of Coriolanus.

⁸¹ Syme, *Sallust*, 117.

⁸² Batstone, “Antithesis of Virtue,” 29, 25.

⁸³ Syme argues merely for a date during the reign of the Triumvirate, *Sallust* (217-19). Rolfe, in the introduction to the Loeb volume, explains that some argue for a date immediately after Caesar’s assassination, while others insist upon 40 BC (xi-xiii).

⁸⁴ Indeed, in the final battle scene, Catiline emerges as a better Roman than the leaders of the Roman armies. In his speech to his troops before battle, Catiline exhorts them, saying that “we contend for our fatherland, for liberty, for our life, while for them it is unnecessary to fight for the power of the few” (*Nos pro patria, pro libertate, pro vita certamus, illis supervacaneum est pro potentia paucorum pugnare*, LVIII.11; *ipse pedes*, LIX.1).

⁸⁵ LIX.4.

⁸⁶ *memor generis atque pristinae suae dignitatis* (LX.7); LXI.1-5.

IV. Livy's Coriolanus: An Anachronistic Caesar?

The historian Livy, working at the end of the 1st century BC, wrote a very different history from that of Caesar or Sallust. His work, *Ab urbe condita*, recounts the history of Rome, beginning with the founding of the city. In this chapter, I will focus on one specific episode of Livy's history, the story of Coriolanus, the powerful Roman general who supposedly marched on Rome, early in the 5th century BC. This story falls within Book II, which is part of the first five books—the first pentad—of Livy's monumental history, which were probably completed between 29-27 BC.¹ The decades in which Livy wrote witnessed massive changes in the governance and representation of the Roman state, and Livy was writing towards a moving target. Octavian's position at Rome was still evolving when Livy began writing, and he could not have known what the end result of his history would be when he began. While the exact nature of Livy's feelings about the future Augustus cannot be determined, it is not unreasonable to posit that Livy was still processing the events of the past decades and figuring what the latest developments might mean for the course of Roman history. Like Octavian, Livy had lived through decades of civil strife that must have had a fundamental impact on the way he understood Roman history. Writing in a time of peace, after Octavian had defeated the biggest challenges to his sole rule, Livy could reflect on Rome's history of civil war as a concept, and not as a reality currently threatening to destroy Rome.

In the introduction to his commentary on the first pentad of Livy, R.M. Ogilvie explains that, like his source and predecessor the historian Licinius, Livy “was not above” supplementing

¹ For a detailed analysis of possible dates, see T.J. Luce, “The Dating of Livy's First Decade,” in *Oxford Readings in Classical Studies: Livy*, eds. Jane Chaplin and Christina Kraus (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 17-47.

his narratives by casting “episodes or incidents from contemporary history back into the past.”² Livy admits in his preface that much of the early history of Rome is based on *fabulae*.³ As Gary Miles explains, *fabulae* serve a distinct purpose within Livy’s history. In discussing the story of Romulus’ genealogy, which traces back to Mars, Miles explains that this *fabula* has a twofold purpose: adding dignity to Livy’s subject, the history of Rome, and expressing “something about how the Romans choose to view and represent themselves; something, moreover, that is in some sense both true and verifiable in the present.”⁴ In the case of the Romulus story, the truth expressed by the *fabula* is Rome’s historical superiority in warfare. I argue that the Coriolanus *fabula*, too, expresses “that something” to which Miles alludes—which is, in this case, the preoccupation of Rome’s elite with *dignitas* and *iniuria*. Like Ogilvie, in their discussion of Livy, Christina Kraus and A.J. Woodman explain that the historian uses conflicts set in ancient Rome, like the Coriolanus episode, to work out issues of the Late Republic and early Augustan periods. They argue that, by doing so,

Livy uses this overlay of historical periods to suggest ways in which through close observation of past events we can find ways of approaching present problems. We see both what ancient Rome was like and what implications problems and challenges like our own may have for the construction of our character and identity.⁵

Livy is not so much writing history as he is creating a Roman identity based on a construction of the past. Ogilvie adds that Livy would enhance incidents about which adequate facts were lacking “by casting them into a particular mould as illustrations of moral truths.”⁶ These episodes

² R.M. Ogilvie, *A Commentary on Livy, Books 1-5* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1965), 10.

³ *OLD*, s.v. “fabula” 1. Talk, conversation; gossip, talk, rumor. 2. A thing said, account, report. 3. A fictitious story or report, tale, fiction. 4. A story told for entertainment, instruction; a fable. 5. A legend, myth; a thing existing only in talk, a mere name, a thing of the past.

⁴ Gary B. Miles, *Livy: Reconstructing Early Rome* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1995), 18.

⁵ Christina Kraus and A.J. Woodman, “Livy,” in *Latin Historians, Greece and Rome: New Surveys in the Classics*, No. 27 (Oxford: Published for the Classical Association by Oxford University Press, 1997), 71.

⁶ Ogilvie, *A Commentary on Livy*, 18.

then receive “a self-contained unity by being turned into moral parables.”⁷ The story of Coriolanus is one such moral parable.

The vast majority of modern scholarship supports the probability that the Coriolanus episode is nothing more than a *fabula*. Livy situates the story in 493 BC,⁸ but the origins of the story are debatable. Cowell refers to it as a “picturesque legend,” and recognizes it as the only instance in the early Republic of a Roman citizen who “seemed willing to use force against his fellow-citizens.”⁹ While Coriolanus may be a legendary figure, according to Cowell, he is still important for the Roman conceptualization of civil war. T.J. Cornell argues that the story of Coriolanus, along with other early Republican legends, was handed down by oral tradition, since not much documentary evidence would have survived down to Livy’s day. Thus, the importance of the episode comes not from its historical implications but from what it says about the Roman people. Similarly, it is important to remember that Livy chooses to retell the story of Coriolanus in a very specific historical and political context.¹⁰ In his chapter “Livy’s Revolution: Civic Identity and the Creation of the *Res Publica*,” Andrew Feldherr writes about how Livy’s depiction of the beginnings of the Republic in the late 6th and early 5th century shows a distinct effort among the early Romans to cultivate a specific civic identity. In his account, Livy emphasizes how, in the Republic, family ties were less significant than the individual’s obligation to the state, yet this idea is more totalitarian, more imperialistic than it is Republican. Writing right before the onset of the Principate, Livy must be considering how, as Feldherr discusses, “this revolution in consciousness can in turn be correlated with a change in the

⁷ Ogilvie, *A Commentary on Livy*, 18.

⁸ *Ibid.*, 314.

⁹ Cowell, *The Great Revolutions: The Revolutions of Ancient Rome*, 44-45.

¹⁰ T.J. Cornell brings up a particularly relevant difficulty, reminding the reader that stories handed down by oral tradition were told and retold in specific social contexts that impacted the way in which the story was remembered, *The Beginnings of Rome: Italy and Rome from the Bronze Age to the Punic Wars (c. 1000-264 BC)*. (New York: Routledge, 1995), 10-11.

systems of communication and representation by which the individual is brought into contact with the collective authority of the state.”¹¹ Indeed, Livy proves what T.P. Wiseman wrote in *Remus: A Roman Myth*, that “changed circumstances demand new myths to comprehend them.”¹²

Iniuria, Inimici, and Hostes: Private or Public?

The episode begins with the capture of the Volsican city of Corioli by Roman troops in an effort to make a treaty with the Latin peoples. During the siege, Gnaeus Marcius, “a youth, eager both with his intelligence and with his hand,” responded well to a situation of sudden danger. He dealt with the immediate situation, and then took a select group of men to storm and sack the town. Marcius’ actions were so outstanding that he, “with his renown, to such an extent, stood in the way of the fame of the consuls.”¹³ In fact, Marcius received so much glory from his actions at Corioli that he became known as Coriolanus.¹⁴ Once the army returned to Rome, the price of grain rose, since the fields had lain fallow during the campaign. A famine set upon the city. This is the first obvious instance of Livy superimposing issues confronted more recently in Roman history onto his narrative of the Early Republic. As Ogilvie points out, the grain dole “is a post-Gracchan improvement,” and the manipulation of the price of grain did not

¹¹ Andrew Feldherr, in *Oxford Readings in Classical Studies: Livy* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 411.

¹² Wiseman, *Remus*, 140.

¹³ *tantumque sua laude obstitit famae consulis Marcius* (II.33.9).

¹⁴ Alternate theories exist as to the origin of the name Coriolanus. Ogilvie posits that the *gens Marcia*, during its rise to prominence in the fourth century, “made Coriolanus a Roman from the Latin city of Corioli (hence his name) who at some indeterminable date as consul (*De Viris Illustr.* 19) offended the people. In this he resembled Camillus and, like Camillus, he was driven from the city into the arms of the Volsci,” *A Commentary on Livy*, (315). However, the Fasti did not indicate a consul by the name of Coriolanus. On the other hand, a record existed of the Roman capture of Corioli in 491, and the story of Coriolanus was attached to this time. The name-changing narrative parallels that of Scipio Africanus who earned his agnomen after defeating Carthage in the Second Punic War.

occur until the time of Gaius Gracchus.¹⁵ The price of grain plays a significant role in the narrative since it is the source of the struggle between Coriolanus as an individual and the *plebs* as a collective, and it is our first indication that Livy is dealing with issues that span beyond early Roman history.

Like other figures of later Roman history, particularly Caesar, Coriolanus is concerned about his *dignitas* and *iniuria*. When the *plebs* and the *patres* begin to debate what to do about the price of grain once a large quantity is imported from Sicily, Coriolanus speaks out on behalf of the *patres* with the ultimatum that the grain price be restored only if the “original authority” that had been recently granted to the tribune of the *plebs* be returned to the *patres*. Indeed, Coriolanus asks, “Shall I endure these *indignities* longer than is necessary?”¹⁶ Referring to recent concessions made to the plebs, Coriolanus frames the Conflict of the Orders as a personal affront. Inversely, the *plebs* accuse him of treating them “as enemies” (*sicut hostes*), a term which, unlike the *inimici* of Caesar’s *Bellum Civile*, tends to denote an enemy of the state or a military opponent.¹⁷ In fact, it would normally be used to describe the Volscians, the people against whom Rome had just waged battle.¹⁸ However, Coriolanus turns this vocabulary against his fellow Romans, and he leaves, “making threats and letting out, even then, hostile breaths

¹⁵ Ogilvie, *A Commentary on Livy*, 315. For a very detailed analysis of the use of the grain dole at Rome, see Robert J. Rowland, Jr., “The ‘Very Poor’ and the Grain Dole at Rome and Oxyrynchus,” *Zeitschrift für Papyrologie und Epigraphik*, Bd. 21 (1976): 69-73. The issue of the dole also appears in Sallust, as he describes how, after the power of the tribunes had been restored during the consulship of Pompey and Crassus, “young men, having acquired the greatest power, to whom there was a fierce age and spirit, began to excite the *plebs* by accusing the senate, then to excite them by giving out lavishly and by promising more, so that they themselves became famous and powerful” (*hominess adulescentes, summam potestatem nacti, quibus aetas animusque ferox erat, coepere senatum crimando plebem exagitare dein largiundo atque pollicitando magis incendere ita ipsi clari potentesque fieri*. XXXVIII.1).

¹⁶ *Egone has indignitates diutius patiar quam necesse est?* (II.34.10).

¹⁷ *OLD*, s.v. “hostis” definitions 1: “A foreigner, stranger,” and 2: “One engaged in hostile (military) activities against a country, etc., an enemy; an individual citizen regarded as, or declared officially to be, an enemy of the state.”

¹⁸ *eodemque tempore ex oppido erupissent hostes, forte in statione Marcius fuit*. “At the same time time that the enemies sprang forth from the town, by chance, Marcius was on guard” (II.33.6).

against his fatherland.”¹⁹ Like Caesar, Coriolanus is fundamentally confused about how to treat political enemies and personal rivals, and this confusion will result in similar actions.

Not only Coriolanus, but also Attius Tullius, his Volscian host and fellow general in the armed conflict against Rome, uses language related to Caesar’s account. When addressing his fellow Volscians after they had been expelled from Rome, according to his and Coriolanus’ plan, Attius Tullius references the “ancient injuries from the Roman people and the devastation of the race of the Volscians.”²⁰ Coriolanus’ treatment of his fellow citizens “as enemies” (*sicut hostes*) complicates the distinction between domestic and foreign hostilities. For a non-Roman the term *iniuria* could carry connotations more related to open warfare and *hostes*. However, by using words like *dignitas* and *iniuria* that appear throughout Caesar’s narrative, Livy is not only blurring the distinction between personal insults and state affairs, but he is also complicating the relationship between the Coriolanus episode and Caesar’s narrative.²¹

While Caesar refers to his opponents as his *inimici*, thereby pointing out how they are the ones who have blown their personal vendetta out of proportion,²² Coriolanus creates a situation in which people are treated as *hostes*. Coriolanus, instead of causing internal civil strife, has become more like a foreign enemy. When camped outside the walls of Rome, Coriolanus and his Volscian cohorts had already refused one embassy from the senate. They sent the ambassadors back with the answer that “if they (the Romans) should wish to enjoy the prize of war by means of leisure, he would remember both the insult of the citizens and the kindness of his hosts, and he would strive so that it would be evident that his spirit had been stirred up while

¹⁹ *minitans patriae hostilesque iam tum spiritus gerens* (II.35.6).

²⁰ “*Ut omnia,*” inquit, “*obliscamini alia, veteres populi Romani iniurias cladesque gentis Volsciorum, hodiernam hanc contumeliam quo tandem animo fertis, qua per nostram ignominiam ludos commisere?*” “Although you may forget the other things, the ancient injuries of the Roman people and the devastation of the race of the Volscians, with what spirit, at last, can you bear the affront of today, by which they began their games with our dishonor?” (II.38.2).

²¹ See above, especially pp. 19-21 of the Caesar chapter.

²² See above, pp. 14-15 of the Caesar chapter.

in exile, not broken down.”²³ Again, Coriolanus refers to the actions of his fellow Romans as an *iniuria*. Referring to the demands of the *plebs* as “indignities” to himself personally,²⁴ he nevertheless treats his opponents “as enemies.” This vocabulary elevates the conflict to the state level. On the other hand, Coriolanus discusses the effects of exile on himself (*sibi*), bringing the conflict back down to the individual level. Like Caesar in his *Bellum Civile*, Coriolanus seems unable to distinguish between injuries done to him personally and injuries done to the Republic. Livy describes how, far from falling into bickering as Coriolanus marched on Rome, the *plebs* and the *patres* were joined by their fear of “the external threat, the greatest bond of concord...however much mistrustful and hostile they were towards each other.”²⁵ Indeed, Coriolanus’ march had the opposite of his intended effect, as the citizens remaining in the city demonstrated the proper way in which to put smaller conflicts aside in favor of the greater good. Coriolanus as “the external threat” provides an intriguing comparison with Barton’s “rogue male, the *rex*, the tyrant who was the one consistently demonized character in Roman culture.”²⁶ According to Barton, the “rogue male” proved to be a greater threat to Rome than the external enemy, but here Livy shows the Romans left in the city referring to Coriolanus as *externus timor*. This description is actually quite fitting, considering the fact that Coriolanus had treated the *plebs* “as enemies,”²⁷ and went away, “making threats and letting out, even then, hostile breaths against his fatherland.”²⁸ He has subverted the proper relationship between citizens, turning a public conflict into a private vendetta, while allowing the Volscians to apply his private anger to their public problems.

²³ *si praeda belli per otium frui velint, memorem se et civium iniuriae et hospitem beneficii adniscurum ut appareat exsilio sibi irritos non fractos animos esse* (II.39.11).

²⁴ *Egone has indignitates diutius patiar quam necesse est?* (II.34.10). See above p. 47.

²⁵ *sed externus timor, maximum concordiae vinculum, quamvis suspectos infensosque inter se iungebat animos* (II.39.7).

²⁶ Barton, *Roman Honor*, 100-101.

²⁷ *Sicut hostes* (II.35.1).

²⁸ *minitans patriae hostilesque iam tum spiritus gerens* (II.35.6).

Individual or Collective Good?

Coriolanus' greatest lesson on the proper relationship between the individual and the collective comes, as all life's most important lessons do, from his mother. The Roman embassy that eventually persuades him to turn back from the city is made up of Roman matrons led by his mother. The Coriolanus episode comes within the greater context of Book II, which addresses the role of the family in the Republic. In the context of restructuring how the individual citizen places himself in relation to the state and to his family, Feldherr points out that Brutus' execution of his sons begins the trajectory of Book II and "Coriolanus' abortive mutiny occurs at the center."²⁹ Book II begins with arguably the most critical period of transition in Roman history before the civil strife of the 1st century BC—the transition from the monarchy to the Republic. The reign of the last monarch, Tarquinius Superbus, had been marked by favoritism towards the royal family. Many Romans seemed to associate his wrongs with the royal family instead of the office of king. Indeed, Brutus speaks on behalf of the people, who could not tolerate the presence of Lucius Tarquinius as consul. A distant relative of Tarquinius Superbus and the husband of the famous Lucretia, Lucius Tarquinius had, with Brutus, overthrown the monarchy. Nevertheless, "the populace is persuaded in their minds that the kingship will disappear along with the Tarquin family,"³⁰ and Brutus asks Lucius Tarquinius to submit to the will of the Roman people, by going into exile and suppressing his own interests to those of the state. Finally, at the urging of his father-in-law, Lucius Tarquinius concedes to their wishes, and sacrifices his career, ruined by his family name, in favor of Rome. This constitutes a precedent-setting incident in Livy's history, after which the family becomes secondary to the state.

²⁹ Feldherr, "Livy's Revolution," 416.

³⁰ "*Ita persuasum est animis, cum gente Tarquinia regnum hinc abiturum*" (II.2.7).

In like fashion, when Brutus discovers that his sons were involved in a conspiracy to return the Tarquinius to Rome, Brutus himself is the one who must inflict the punishment of execution. Livy describes Brutus as “more conspicuous because the consulate imposed on the father the duty of exacting the penalty on his sons, and he who should have been banished as a spectator, to that very same one fortune made the exactor of the punishment.”³¹ Indeed, Brutus ensures that his sons “might be, in both respects, a well-known example for deterring crime,”³² and also sets a precedent for valuing the safety of the state over one’s family, even over the lives of one’s children. Along the same lines, in the middle of the Coriolanus narrative comes the story of the dream of the plebeian Titus Latinius. Latinius is scared to disclose a dream in which he is warned to inform the consuls that the Great Games must be repeated in order to gain the favor of the gods. After losing his son and his own health before notifying the consuls, he learns to value the safety of the Republic above his own personal reputation.³³ Juxtaposed with this episode is the story of Coriolanus, who does not learn until it is too late that he should value the security of Rome over his own sense of personal dignity.

Livy records some ambiguity as to whether the embassy led by Coriolanus’ mother was the result of “public policy or the fear of women.”³⁴ Regardless of its origin, this contingent clearly had the true interests of the Republic at heart, as the women argue for the good of the Republic (*res publica*) in such an emotional, personal way (as if it were a *res privata*). Veturia, Coriolanus’ mother, blends the private and the public, but in the appropriate way, and Livy speaks of her approvingly. She cares so deeply about the Republic that her private, personal interests are compromised. Indeed, she would have preferred not to have a son than to see the

³¹ *conspicuius eo quod poenae capiendae ministerium patri de liberis consulatus imposuit, et qui spectator erat amovendus, eum ipsum fortuna exactorem supplicii dedit* (II.5.5).

³² *ut in utramque partem arcendis sceleribus exemplum nobile esset* (II.5.9).

³³ II.36.

³⁴ *Id publicum consilium an muliebris timor fuerit parum invenio* (II.40.1).

Republic endangered by him. In no situation is the conflict between the interests of the individual and those of the state more sensitive than in cases in which the state demands that the individual split from his or her family, yet this is exactly the distinction for which Veturia argues.

Upon first approaching her son, Veturia asks whether she has come “to an enemy or to my son.”³⁵ To her, Coriolanus cannot be her real son if he would become an enemy of Rome. In the scenario in which she is forced to choose between her son and the Republic, she chooses the Republic. She asks how he was able “to lay waste to this land, which gave you birth and nourished you.”³⁶ Here, she goes so far as to allow Rome to take her own role in the family structure, that of the life-giving mother. Again, Veturia asks her son if, when he looked upon the walls of Rome, he did not think to himself, “Within those walls are my home and my household gods, my mother, my wife, and my children.”³⁷ To some degree, he is to think of the land within those walls as his mother, not just containing his mother. In this episode, Livy idealizes the Republic as a time in which family ties meant nothing in comparison with individuals’ commitments to the state. He promotes this as a Republican principle, one which Octavian has begun to revive. Feldherr explains Livy’s emphasis on the principle of citizenship as a result of the expansion of the Roman Empire to the extent that a provincial like Livy would have had to choose to identify himself first as a Roman, instead of as Padovian. Similarly, in *De Officiis* I.XVII.57, Cicero, himself a man of provincial origin, explains that,

Out of all relationships, there is nothing more serious, nothing more dear than that which exists for each one of us with the *res publica*. Parents are dear, children are dear, relatives, and good friends, but the fatherland embraces every affection of ours, for it, what noble man would hesitate to meet his death, if he might be useful?³⁸

³⁵ *ad hostem an ad filium venerim* (II.40.5).

³⁶ *Potuisti populari hanc terram, quae te genuit atque aluit?* (II.40.7).

³⁷ “*Intra illa moenia domus ac penates mei sunt, mater coniunx liberique*”? (II.40.7).

³⁸ Cicero, *De Officiis*, trans. Walter Miller, Loeb Classical Library (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1975), I.VII.57.

Regarding this passage, Feldherr writes that “civic loyalty is a natural extension of all other affections. If you love your wife and children you will necessarily love the Republic which encompasses and protects them. Except you have to love the Republic more. It is not enough to serve the Republic simply as a means of preserving your family.”³⁹ This ideology reflects Livy’s projection of the values of the early Principate onto the early Republic, and echoes the words of Coriolanus’ mother. In *The Roman Revolution*, Syme explains that the morality and marriage legislations passed in subsequent years had as their aim “to bring the family under the protection of the State—a measure quite superfluous so long as Rome remained her ancient self” and represented an unprecedented encroachment on the autonomy of the family.⁴⁰ Livy’s insistence on the superiority of the state over family ties appears to be influenced by Octavian’s agenda.

Swayed by his mother’s powerful rhetoric, Coriolanus withdrew his army from Rome. Livy reports that “some say that he died, weighed down by the resentment of this act.”⁴¹ Coriolanus realized the problem with his priorities, but he realized it too late, and for the wrong reasons. A good citizen, as Veturia argues, would have known not to march on Rome in the first place. Neither Coriolanus, nor Catiline, nor Caesar falls into this category. However, as demonstrated above, the obligations of a good citizen as depicted by Livy do not necessarily match what might have actually been the case in the 5th century. As for the Roman matrons, their fame earned them no envy, and Livy reports that the temple of Fortuna Muliebris was built in their memory.⁴² He specifies that, in those days, “to such an extent was the glory of another without detraction,”⁴³ recognizing tacitly that the same situation was not true at the time in which

³⁹ Feldherr, “Livy’s Revolution,” 414-5.

⁴⁰ Syme, *The Roman Revolution*, 444-6.

⁴¹ *invidia rei oppressum perire tradunt alii* (II.40.10).

⁴² II.40.12.

⁴³ II.40.11.

he was writing. This assertion speaks contrary to Sallust's description of early Roman history, in which "each great man preferred to act rather than to speak, and that his own services be praised by others rather than that he himself narrate the services of others."⁴⁴ The contradiction between Livy's and Sallust's conceptualizations of praise and glory in the early Republic reveals more about the difference between the times in which they were writing than the times about which they were writing. Still faced with the reality of civil war, Sallust recognizes that this potential for ambition exists, and has existed for some time at Rome. On the other hand, Livy idealizes this supposed Republican characteristic in the same way that he also retrojects the awareness of Rome's history of civil war and the self-sacrifice in service of the state promoted by Octavian.

Coriolanus as a Literary Model for Caesar

Livy has set out in his preface that his work is meant to provide models of behavior to his readers. He writes: "This is what is especially beneficial and fruitful in the investigation of things past, that you look upon every kind of case as examples placed upon an illustrious monument; from there you may take for yourself and for your Republic what to mimic, from there, rotten from beginning to end, what you should avoid."⁴⁵ As an obvious instance of an individual citizen who takes personal *iniuria* too seriously, Coriolanus can be seen as a kind of model for Caesar, retroactively placed into Rome's past so that Livy can fictionalize and emphasize the way in which Augustus has broken with a centuries-long Roman tradition of civil

⁴⁴ *optumus quisque facere quam dicere, sua ab aliis benefacta laudari quam ipse aliorum narrare malebat* (VIII.5).

⁴⁵ *Hoc illud est praecipue in cognitione rerum salubre ac frugiferum, omnis te exempli documenta in inlustri posita monumento intueri; inde tibi tuaeque rei publicae quod imitere capias, inde foedum inceptu, foedum exitu, quod vitas* (I.1.10).

war.⁴⁶ By working with the story of Coriolanus, Livy represents an awareness of civil strife at Rome that, as explained in the two previous chapters, most Late Republican Romans took pains to deny. Livy sets a new precedent for understanding the place of Julius Caesar in Roman history.

As I explained at the beginning of this chapter, Livy treats Coriolanus as a *fabula*, a legend set in the early Republic that describes a fundamental truth of Roman identity. The episode conveys that powerful, aristocratic men are very concerned with possible *iniuria* to their *dignitas*, and that they will take hostile action to defend their reputations. Later accounts of Caesar draw heavily on the Coriolanus episode, as though Coriolanus were some sort of precedent (*exemplum*) for Caesar. Livy's Coriolanus episode becomes a literary mold, which later authors will apply to their characterizations of Caesar. In a way, in later accounts, Caesar's march on Rome takes the same place as a *fabula* as Coriolanus' march does in Livy, and Caesar's civil war becomes a new founding story, by which the Principate becomes a new era that has moved beyond civil war.

⁴⁶ Matthew Fox explains the importance of the flexibility of such *exempla*: "The mutability of historical *exempla* in rhetoric, as well as the surviving narratives of Sallust, Livy, and Tacitus, all suggest that at Rome, readers were much less concerned about consistency in this respect, and that the imaginative function of history was more important than the question of sources," *Cicero's Philosophy of History* (163). Later: "This vividness does not depend on historical accuracy, however, so much as upon the power of the historical evocation to strike at the preoccupations of its readers, and to exhort them to measure their own conceptions of the *res publica* by that projected from the past. The moral imperative that comes from history is for those learning about these figures to measure their own conduct in terms of the perpetuation of their own reputation" (165).

V. Conclusion: Resolving the Paradox

The Roman Republic rested on a paradox. On one side lay the contest culture. As Sallust explains, male members of Rome's political and social elite needed to distinguish themselves, "lest they pass through life in silence, as flocks do, whom nature fashioned face-down and obedient to their bellies."¹ To do so, they had to win *gloria* for themselves. At the same time, however, *gloria* could only be won by means of outstanding service to the Republic. On the other side of the paradox lay self-service to the Republic, and limits were enforced to keep men from becoming too powerful, as evidenced by Cicero's account of the interregnum in *De Republica* II. Cicero's Scipio explains that the *patres* decided that *imperium* would rotate among them "until a fixed king was declared, in order that the state not be without a king, nor be entrusted to a single, long-lasting king, and lest someone, with his power of long standing, might be too slow at putting away his power or too secure in holding onto it."² The tension between these two ideals—one of exemplary service to the collective good and one of aristocratic competition—resulted, on a number of occasions, in civil strife. Being part of a contest culture, powerful men often had trouble letting go of their authority and putting the interests of the Republic before their own.

The historical accounts of Julius Caesar, Sallust, and Livy represent the evolution of the Roman conceptualization of civil war over a span of a quarter of a century. During this time period, the Roman contest culture underwent massive changes, from having a surplus of powerful men competing for authority to having just one *princeps*. As Syme explains, "the last

¹ *Omnis homines qui sese student praestare ceteris animalibus summa ope niti decet ne vitam silentio transeant veluti pecora, quae natura prona atque ventri oboedientia finxit* (I.1).

² *ut, quoad certus rex declaratus esset, nec sine rege civitas nec diuturno rege esset uno nec committeretur, ut quisquam inveterate potestate aut ad deponendum imperium tardier esset aut ad optinendum munitior* (*De Rep.*, trans. Clinton Walker Keyes, II.XII.23).

century of the Free State witnessed a succession of striking individuals—a symptom of civic degeneration and a cause of disaster.”³ Writing a history of Rome beginning with the founding of the city, Livy retrojects elements of his present, in which Octavian put an end to civil strife at Rome, onto Rome’s past. Whereas Sallust’s history contains a brief and succinct report of Rome’s development, Livy dedicates the first part of his monumental work to recounting the *fabulae* of the Early Republic. Sallust *tells* his audience about the paradox of Republicanism, explaining in his removed narrator’s voice that, to the men of the early Republic, “no labor was unaccustomed; no place was at all dark or steep, no armed enemy was scary; virtue was the master of all. But the greatest contest for glory was among themselves”⁴ and that Republican men “were desirous of praise, generous with money; they wished for huge glory, honest riches.”⁵ On the other hand, Livy *shows* this same truth to his audience by means of episodes like the Coriolanus story. Differently from both of these authors, Julius Caesar, for the most part, ignores the paradox of the Republic altogether, although he is, in fact, the greatest proof of its existence and of its unsustainable nature.

The story of Coriolanus in Livy sets a legendary precedent for future representations of Julius Caesar. In a way, the story of Julius Caesar marching on Rome becomes a *fabula* of the foundation and early history of the Empire in the same way that the Coriolanus episode is a *fabula* of the Early Republic. In Livy’s episode, Coriolanus’ mother Veturia addresses her son outside the gates of Rome, where he has camped with his Volscian army. The Roman matron asks her son if, when he looked upon the walls of Rome, he did not think to himself that he was

³ Syme, *The Roman Revolution*, 441.

⁴ *Igitur talibus viris non labor insolitus, non locus ullus asper aut arduus erat, non armatus hostis formidulosus; virtus omnia domuerat. Sed gloriae maximum certamen inter ipsos erat* (VII.5).

⁵ *Laudis avidi, pecuniae liberalis errant; gloriam ingentem, divitias volebant* (VII.6).

marching on his own family members.⁶ This prosopopeia calls to mind Lucan's image of the goddess Roma appearing to Caesar as he contemplated crossing the Rubicon. Written over half a century after Livy's histories, Lucan's *Pharsalia* features, in the first book, Caesar and his army contemplating crossing the Rubicon when:

a huge image of the fatherland, distressed, appeared to the general, clear throughout the dark night and most mournful in her face, streaming out flowing white hair from her head, girded with towers, she stood, mangled, and with bare arms, and, disturbed with groans, she spoke: "Where do you stretch further? Where do you carry my standards, man? If you come legally, if you are a citizen, it is permitted only to here."⁷

With her white hair and bare arms, Roma here appears in the form of a Roman matron in mourning, much as Veturia would have been. Lucan is dramatizing the moment in which Caesar chooses to bring civil war to Rome, and he creates an image very similar to that of Coriolanus' mother. Moreover, the intent of the two speeches is the same; the image of Roma, like Veturia, appears at the time when a true Roman *cives* would have recognized that his actions were wrong. These external figures provide a check on the actions of powerful leaders who have reacted with private anger to a public, political issue. They embody the internal monologue that each character should have had, for Caesar before he crossed the Rubicon, and for Coriolanus when he looked upon the walls of Rome. Swayed by his mother's powerful rhetoric, Coriolanus withdrew his army from Rome, Yet, unlike the embassy led by Coriolanus' mother, the

⁶"*Intra illa moenia domus ac penates mei sunt, mater coniunx liberique*"? (II.40.7). See above, p. 52.

⁷ I.186-192: *Ingens isa duci patriae trepidantis imago
Clara per obscuram voltu maestissima noctem,
Turriero canos effundens vertice crines,
Caesarie lacera nudisque adstare lacertis
Et gemitu permixta loqui: "Quo tenditis ultra?
Quo fertis mea signa, viri? Si iure venitis,
Si cives, hus usque licet."*

apparition of the goddess Roma in Lucan is unable to stop Caesar or to persuade him to turn back.⁸

Lucan's account is not the only historical work that features such an apparition. In Suetonius' version of the story, as Caesar was contemplating whether to cross the boundary or not,

On a sudden there appeared hard by a being of wondrous stature and beauty, who sat and played upon a reed; and when not only the shepherds flocked to hear him, but many of the soldiers left their posts, and among them some of the trumpeters, the apparition snatched a trumpet from one of them, rushed to the river, and sounding the war-note with mighty blast, strode to the opposite bank. Then Caesar cried: 'Take we the course which the signs of the gods and the false dealing of our foes point out. The die is cast,' said he.⁹

In this case, Caesar receives a divine portent that reassures him that he is making the correct decision, not one that urges him to turn back. Yet the moment of contemplation resembles that of Lucan's earlier account, which in turn mimics the incident between Coriolanus and his mother. Writing another 50 years after Lucan began his poem, Suetonius has a pro-imperial point of view and sees the founding *fabula* of Caesar's march in a positive light. Much like the legend of Romulus and Remus, Caesar's march on Rome has evolved over time. Both of these

⁸ Earlier precedent exists for the embodiment of a state addressing one of its rogue citizens. In Plato's *Crito*, Socrates envisions a similar, but more complex situation, in which he carries out an extended theoretical conversation with the laws of the city. He begins:

If, as I was on the point of running away (or whatever it should be called), the laws and the commonwealth should come to me and ask, "Tell me, Socrates, what have you in mind to do? Are you not intending by this thing you are trying to do, to destroy us, the laws, and the entire state so far as in you lies? Or do you think that state can exist and not be overturned, in which the decisions reached by the courts have no force but are made invalid and annulled by private persons? (50a-c).

In this scenario, Socrates' friends are encouraging him to run away from the city to escape his unjust punishment, but Socrates argues that he cannot use the injustice done to him by the city as an excuse for him to wrong the city in return. In this paradigmatic theoretical conversation, Socrates is able to recognize what neither Caesar, Catiline, nor Coriolanus could—that returning the wrong done to him by the city is still wrong, and no state which allows this can stand for long.

⁹ *Cunctanti ostentum tale factum est. Quidam eximia magnitudine et forma in proximo sedens repente apparuit harudine canens; ad quem audiendum cum praeter pastores plurimi etiam ex stationibus milites concurrissent interque eos et aeneatores, rapta ab uno tuba prosilivit ad flumen et ingenti spiritu classicum exorsus pertendit ad alteram ripam. Tumc Caesar: "Eatur," inquit, "quo deorum ostenta et inimicorum iniquitas vocat. Iacta alea est," inquit (Suet., *The Deified Julius* 32, trans. J.C. Rolfe, Loeb Classical Library (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1989). Note the use of *inimicorum* to distinguish Caesar's foes.*

imperial accounts of Caesar's march on Rome reveal the influence of Livy's early Republican *fabulae*. On the other hand, in *Bellum Civile*, Caesar himself does not mention crossing the Rubicon.¹⁰ To some degree, the crossing of the Rubicon is an invented piece of Roman history that evolves in the same way as the Romulus and Remus myth.

In the introduction to *The Invention of Tradition*, editors Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger define "invented traditions." Although this volume, for the most part, addresses actual ceremonial, symbolic traditions acted out in the past few centuries in Britain, the editors observe connections between past and present that apply universally. They write that:

'Traditions' which appear or claim to be old are often quite recent in origin and sometimes invented... 'Invented tradition' is taken to mean a set of practices, normally governed by overtly or tacitly accepted rules and of a ritual or symbolic nature, which seek to inculcate certain values and norms of behavior by repetition, which automatically implies continuity with the past. In fact, where possible, they normally attempt to establish continuity with a suitable historic past.¹¹

I believe that this definition can also be applied to Octavian's attempt, apparently supported by Livy, to link the *fabulae* of the early Republic with the new founding *fabula* of Caesar's march on Rome. As Matthew Fox explains in *Cicero's Philosophy of History*, "the pose of historical revival enabled Augustus to embark on a type of social and political engineering without precedent in antiquity."¹² In this respect, Augustus' "historical revival" creates the same relationship between past and present as the "invented tradition" does. Only once Octavian had quelled the civil wars that had plagued Rome for the past century were Romans able to address the preceding centuries of civil strife. Livy and other imperial writers, like Horace, were able to include the murder of Remus by Romulus and address Rome's history of civil war. On the other

¹⁰ *Cognita militum voluntate Ariminum cum ea leione proficiscitur ibique tribunos plebes, qui ad eum profugerant, convenit.* "Once the will of the soldiers was known, he sets out for Arminium with that legion, and there he met the tribunes of the *plebs*, who had fled to him" (Caes, *Bellum Civile*, I.1).

¹¹ Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger, eds., *The Invention of Tradition* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), 1.

¹² Fox, *Cicero's Philosophy of History*, 175.

hand, Caesar and Sallust actively avoided those topics, as this disturbing version of the Romulus and Remus myth bore too much of a resemblance to their current circumstances.

In the Battle of Actium, Octavian solves the paradox of the Republic by consolidating all power and *gloria*. The unequal playing field of Roman politics will become permanent,¹³ and only the princeps and the imperial family will receive any recognition for service to the Republic. As Syme explains in *The Roman Revolution*, “a well-ordered state has no need of great men, and no room for them,” as opposed to the preceding century of Republican politics, full of great men.¹⁴ However, since Octavian has solved the paradox of Republican politics, those who would be “great men” must now go through their lives *silentio*, no better than the beasts.

¹³ See above, p. 39.

¹⁴ Syme, *Roman Revolution*, 441.

VI. Bibliography

- Batstone, William W. "The Antithesis of Virtue: Sallust's 'Synkrisis' and the Crisis of the Late Republic." *Classical Antiquity* 7, No. 1 (April, 1988): 1-29.
- "Word At War: The Prequel." In *Citizens of Discord: Rome and Its Civil Wars*, edited by Brian W. Breed, Cynthia Damon, and Andreola Rossi, 45-72. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010.
- Batstone, William W. and Cynthia Damon. *Caesar's Civil War*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006.
- Barton, Carlin A. *Roman Honor: The Fire in the Bones*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001.
- Breed, Brian W., Cynthia Damon, and Andreola Rossi. *Citizens of Discord: Rome and Its Civil Wars*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010.
- Burke, Peter. "History as Social Memory." In *Memory: History, Culture, and the Mind*, edited by Thomas Butler, 97-113. Oxford: Blackwell, 1989.
- Caesar, Julius. *The Civil Wars*. Translated by A.G. Peskett. Loeb Classical Library. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1914.
- Cicero, Marcus Tullius. *De Republica and De Legibus*. Translated by Clinton Walker Keyes. Loeb Classical Library. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1977.
- *De Officiis*. Translated by Walter Miller. Loeb Classical Library. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1975.
- *Letters To His Friends*. Edited and translated by D.R. Shackleton Bailey. Loeb Classical Library. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2001.
- "In Catilinam I." In *The Speeches*. Translated by Louis E. Lord. Loeb Classical Library. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1946.
- Chaplin, Jane D. *Livy's Exemplary History*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000.
- Chaplin, Jane and Christina S. Kraus, eds. *Oxford Readings in Classical Studies: Livy*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009.
- Chilver, G.E.F. "The Aftermath of Caesar." *Greece & Rome*, Second Series 4, No. 1 (Mar., 1957): 71-77.
- Conley, Duane F. "The Interpretation of Sallust *Catiline* 10.1-11.3." *Classical Philology* 76, No. 2 (April, 1981): 121-125.

- Cornell, Tim J. "Coriolanus: Myth, History, and Performance." In *Myth, History, and Culture in Republican Rome: Studies in Honour of T.P. Wiseman*, edited by David Braund and Christopher Gill, 73-97. Exeter: University of Exeter Press, 2003.
- , *The Beginnings of Rome: Italy and Rome from the Bronze Age to the Punic Wars (c. 1000-264 BC)*. New York: Routledge, 1995.
- Cowell, F.R. *The Great Revolutions: The Revolutions of Ancient Rome*. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., 1963.
- Earl, D.C. *The Political Thought of Sallust*. Chicago: Argonaut Inc., 1966.
- Feldherr, Andrew. "Livy's Revolution: Civic Identity and the Creation of the *Res Publica*." In *Oxford Reading in Classical Studies Livy*, edited by Jane D. Chaplin and Christina S. Kraus, 409-435. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009.
- Flower, Harriet I. *Roman Republics*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2010.
- Fox, Matthew. *Cicero's Philosophy of History*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007.
- Gruen, Erich S. *The Last Generation of the Roman Republic*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1974.
- Hobsbawn, Eric and Terence Ranger, eds. *Invention of Tradition*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983.
- Kraus, Christina S. and A.J. Woodman. *Latin Historians*. Greece and Rome: New Surveys in the Classics, No. 27. Oxford: Published for the Classical Association by Oxford University Press, 1997.
- Lehman, Alan D. "The Coriolanus Story in Antiquity." *The Classical Journal* 47, No. 8 (May, 1952): 329-336.
- Livy. *History of Rome*. Translated by B.O. Foster. Vol. 1, Books I and II. Loeb Classical Library. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1919.
- Lucan. *The Civil War (Pharsalia)*. Translated by J.D. Duff. Loeb Classical Library. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1988.
- Luce, T.J. "The Dating of Livy's 1st Decade." In *Oxford Readings in Classical Studies: Livy*, edited by Jane D. Chaplin and Christina S. Kraus, 17-48. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009.
- Miles, Gary B. *Livy: Reconstructing Early Rome*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1995.

- Ogilvie, R.M. *A Commentary on Livy, Books I-V*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1965.
- Pagán, V.E. "Sallust: The Conspiracy of Catiline." In *Conspiracy Narratives in Roman History*, 27-49. Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 2004.
- Polybius. *The Histories*. Translated by W.R. Paton. Loeb Classical Library. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1979.
- Raaflaub, Kurt A. "Creating a Grand Coalition of True Roman Citizens: On Caesar's Political Strategy in the Civil War." In *Citizens of Discord: Rome and Its Civil Wars*, edited by Brian W. Breed, Cynthia Damon, and Andreola Rossi, 159-170. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010.
- Rowland, Robert J. "The 'Very Poor' and the Grain Dole at Rome and Oxyrhynchus." *Zeitschrift für Papyrologie und Epigraphik* Bd. 21 (1976): 69-73.
- Sallust. *The War With Catiline*. Translated by J.C. Rolfe. Loeb Classical Library. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1971.
- , *Sallust's Bellum Catilinae*. Edited, with Introduction and Commentary by J.T. Ramsey. American Philological Association Textbook Series. Atlanta, GA: Scholars Press, 1984.
- Suetonius. "The Deified Julius." In *The Lives of the Caesars*. Translated by J.C. Rolfe. Loeb Classical Library. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1989.
- Syme, Ronald. *The Roman Revolution*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1939.
- , *Sallust*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1964.
- Thucydides. *The Landmark Thucydides: A Comprehensive Guide to the Peloponnesian War*. Edited and translated by Robert B. Strassler, and Richard Crawley. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1998.
- Treggiari, Susan. "Ancestral Virtues and Vices: Cicero on Nature, Nurture and Presentation." *Myth, History, and Culture in Republican Rome: Studies in Honour of T.P. Wiseman*, edited by David Braund and Christopher Gill, 139-164. Exeter: University of Exeter Press, 2003.
- Vasaly, Ann. "Characterization and complexity: Caesar, Sallust, and Livy." In *The Cambridge Companion to the Roman Historians*, edited by Andrew Feldherr, 245-260. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009.
- Waters, K.H. "Cicero, Sallust, and Catiline." *Historia: Zeitschrift für Alte Geschichte* 19, No. 2 (Apr., 1970): 195-215.
- Wiseman, T.P. *Remus: A Roman Myth*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995.

----- "The Two-Headed State: How Romans Explained Civil War." In *Citizens of Discord: Rome and Its Civil Wars*, edited by Brian Breed, Cynthia Damon, and Andreola Rossi, 25-44. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010.

Yavetz, Z. "The Failure of Catiline's Conspiracy." *Historia: Zeitschrift für Alte Geschichte* 12.4 (Oct., 1963): 485-499.